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ABSTRACT 
ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF PENALTIES ON REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 
BY 
VID ADRISON 
DECEMBER 2007 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Paul J. Ferraro 
Major Department: Economics 
 
 This dissertation has two main objectives. First, we investigate the effectiveness 
of penalties and other enforcement tools on regulatory compliance, and comprehensively 
address problems that exist in previous regulatory compliance studies. Second, we 
develop a model that explains why most empirical studies of regulatory compliance yield 
results that seem to be inconsistent with the theoretical predictions of Harrington’s (1988) 
seminal article on regulatory compliance. Thus the dissertation comprises two essays. 
In Essay One, we estimate facility compliance with the Clean Water Act (CWA) 
by comprehensively addressing the problems that exist in previous studies. The first 
problem is the failure to take into account undetected violations. To address this problem, 
we employ Detection Controlled Estimation (DCE) model, developed by Feinstein 
(1990). The DCE variant that we use is the two-sided expectation simultaneity version. 
We use this version because we assume that potential violators will react to what the 
regulator would do, and vice versa. The second problem that we address is in the 
measurement of regulatory penalties. Previous studies use dummy variables, but using a
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 continuous measure of penalty enables us to differentiate the responses of minor from 
substantial violators, and avoid measurement error. Finally, we use a richer set of 
covariates. We include variables that were found to be statistically and economically 
significant in different previous studies, but which have never been estimated jointly.  
The results in Essay One indicate that facilities do respond to penalties, but the 
effect is economically insignificant. We argue that the small effect of penalties in 
reducing noncompliance comes from the way regulators enforce the regulations:  
penalties are rarely imposed on detected violators, or if imposed, the amount is usually 
negligible. The policy implication that arises from our findings is that if regulators want 
to see a substantial increase in the probability of compliance, it should consider imposing 
more frequent and severe penalties. The positive effects of more stringent enforcement on 
compliance rates come from three sources: (1) through specific deterrence effect; (2) 
through general deterrence effect; and (3) through an increase in the probability of self-
reported violations, which allows for more efficient use of inspection budgets.  
In Essay Two, we extend Harrington’s (1988) theoretical model by (1) 
introducing an imperfect detection parameter, and (2) relaxing the movement between the 
groups, as in Friesen (2003). The extended model shows that when detection is imperfect, 
the zone for the “always-violate” strategy expands. This expansion has two implications. 
First, when firms are uniformly distributed in cost space, the number of firms that choose 
the “always-violate” strategy increases. Second, any empirical study that uses major 
facilities will be more likely to confirm “always-violate” strategy, but fail to confirm the 
other two strategies discussed in Harrington (1988). We also discuss other possibilities 
that can contribute to the difference between empirical results and theoretical predictions. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 For at least four decades (Becker 1968), economists have applied economic 
theory and empirical methods to study an individual’s decision to commit an illegal act.  
In the theoretical literature, the majority of studies predict that higher inspection rate and 
severe monetary penalty improve compliance rates.1 Some studies, however, suggest that 
increasing enforcement stringency does not necessarily lead to higher compliance rates. 
For instance, Heyes (1993) analytically shows that increasing inspection frequency may 
lead firms to spend more resources toward decreasing probability of detection.2  Kambhu 
(1989) shows that increased enforcement stringency may have a reverse effect on 
environmental performance. Such unconventional conclusion comes from the possibility 
that firms may invest more on penalty eroding activities instead of installing pollution 
abatement technologies. Kadambe and Segerson (1998) also show that increased 
enforcement stringency does not necessarily lead to higher compliance rate.  
 In the empirical literature, many studies detect the positive impact of inspection 
on compliance decisions.3 However, the effectiveness of penalties in promoting 
                                                 
1 For instances, see Downing and Watson (1974), Harford (1978), Story and McCabe (1980), Lansberger 
and Meilijson (1982), Greenberg (1984) and Harrington (1988) 
 
2 He uses the term “inspectability” to describe the ability of the regulator to detect a violation. The 
inspectability can be reduced by using less transparent technologies.  
 
3 Environmental compliance studies that confirm the positive effect of inspection on compliance include 
Magat and Viscusi (1990), Deily and Gray (1991), Gray and Deily (1996), Laplante and Rilstone (1996), 
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environmental compliance is less conclusive. We argue that weak empirical support for 
the effectiveness of penalty in promoting regulatory compliance is primarily due to two 
reasons. First, the number of environmental compliance studies that include penalty is 
still very scant. Based on our literature search, we found seven studies that include 
penalty in their analysis between the period of 1989 and 2006.4 Second, each study that 
includes penalties in its analysis has attributes that can bias its conclusions.  
 First, most studies fail to take into account undetected violations. As shown by 
Feinstein (1989; 1990; 1991), ignoring undetected violations will lead to downward bias 
of parameter estimates. Among the seven studies that include penalty, only Feinstein 
(1989) and Scholz and Wang (2006) take into account the undetected violations.  
Second, most studies fail to incorporate the general deterrence effect of penalties. 
Shimshack and Ward (2005) argue that ignoring regulatory “reputation” –the term they 
use for general deterrence--leads to an overestimate of the parameters for penalties and 
other sanctions.  
Third, most studies fail to use a correct penalty measure. All studies of 
environmental compliance, with the exception of Shimshack and Ward (2005), use a 
discrete measure for penalty. Using a discrete penalty measure introduces measurement 
error in the model. Since compliance decisions are mostly estimated using nonlinear 
model, the effects of measurement error can be serious. As shown by Carroll et al. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nadeau (1997), Helland (1998a;1998b), Stafford (2002), Shimshack and Ward (2005) and Scholz and 
Wang (2006). 
 
4 Those studies are Feinstein (1989), Hamilton (1996), Kleit et al. (1998), Stafford (2002), Earnhart (2004), 
Shimshack and Ward (2005), and Scholz and Wang (2006. Hamilton (1996) and Kleit et al. (1998), 
however, treated penalty as dependent instead of independent variable.  
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(1984), the impact of measurement error in a nonlinear model is substantial if the sample 
size is large and the error is severe.  
 In addition to the contradictory empirical results regarding the effect of penalties 
on compliance decisions, there is also a gap between theoretical predictions and the 
empirical evidence on the relationship between past and current compliance decisions. 
One widely cited theoretical work that explains firms’ compliance behavior is Harrington 
(1988). He analytically shows that the strategy chosen by a firm depends on its 
compliance cost. To be specific, firms with low compliance cost will always comply, 
firms with large compliance cost will always violate, and firms with medium compliance 
cost will alternate compliance decisions based on their previous inspection outcome (i.e., 
a firm will comply in current period if it was found in violation in previous inspection, 
and vice versa). However, the majority of empirical studies only detect one strategy (the 
“always-violate” strategy).  We reconcile the disparity between prediction and evidence 
by extending Harrington’s model to allow imperfect detection and movement between 
enforcement groups. 
We organize this dissertation as follows. Chapter II presents the literature review 
on regulatory compliance. Chapter III presents Essay One, where we investigate the 
effect of penalties (and other enforcement variables) on compliance decisions.  Chapter 
IV presents Essay Two, where we attempt to explain why empirical studies only partially 
support Harrington theoretical predictions. 
4 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Theoretical 
 The literature of regulatory enforcement has been available before 1968. Yet, it is 
Becker’s (1968) work which becomes the benchmark for many economists in conducting 
their research. Since his seminal paper, studies on regulatory enforcement have been 
enriched by various theoretical and empirical works. Becker (1968) describes two policy 
variables to reduce the number of offenses to socially optimal level; probability of 
conviction (p) and penalty (f). He contends that the magnitude impact of these variables 
on crime reduction depends on the risk preference of potential violators. For risk lovers, 
an increase in p will have a larger impact on crime reduction compare to an equal 
percentage increase in f. The opposite case holds for those who are risk averse. If the 
potential violators are risk neutral, both policies have the same effect.  
 Becker’s article triggered more studies on regulatory enforcement in the following 
years. In the early years, theoretical models developed by scholars are mostly static. For 
instances, see Downing and Watson (1974), Harford, (1978), Storey and McCabe (1980). 
In a static model, potential violators and regulator can not react to each other’s action. 
Since this is unlikely the case in the real world, scholars developed theoretical models 
where agents anticipate what others would react if they choose a particular action.  
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 The new models which constructed in game theory and multi-period setting 
emerged in the 80s (for example, see Lansberger and Meilijson 1982; Greenberg 1984; 
Harrington 1988). Harrington (1988) developed his model due to inability of one-period 
game model to explain somewhat contradictory fact in U.S. case: i.e., enforcement is 
carried out by EPA at such a low level, and violations are rarely punished even if 
discovered, yet, most of the firms are in compliance. To explain such phenomenon, he 
develops a model where firms are divided into two categories and one group faces more 
severe enforcement than another. Movement between the groups is possible, and it 
depends on previous inspection result. The main results of his model are (1) firms with 
low compliance cost will always comply, (2) firms with high compliance cost will always 
violate, (3) firms with medium cost of compliance will alternate decision based on the 
previous inspection result. Firms found in compliance in the previous inspection will be 
more likely to violate in the subsequent period, while firms found in violations will 
comply in the next period. This interesting firms’ behavior is called “Harrington 
Paradox” by follower authors.  
 Other extension derives from the fact that regulator have some constraints in 
conducting audit. One of the constraints is operating/inspection cost, which cause 
regulator to direct inspection more towards those who are a more likely to violate. By 
doing so, the expected social welfare would be higher given the same level of 
enforcement effort. This kind of targeting policy is initially developed in taxation context 
(Lansberger and Meilijson 1982; Greenberg 1984).  
6 
 
 In the theoretical work, increasing inspection/enforcement effort does not 
necessarily lead to better outcome, as shown by Heyes (1993, 2000), Kambhu (1989) and 
Kadambe and Segerson (1998). 
 Heyes (1993, 2000) creates a theoretical model by focusing on the ability of the 
regulator to discover a violation once it occurs, which he refers as “inspectability.” Heyes 
(1993) describes two factors that determine the probability of detecting an incident of 
non-compliant; thoroughness (t) and the amount of firms’ investment to increase un-
inspectability (n). Analytically, he shows that increasing the thoroughness of inspection 
induces firms to substitute towards more transparent technologies. On the other hand, 
increasing frequency of inspection will cause substitution the other way. One surprising 
result of his model is that increasing frequency of inspection may worsen firms’ 
environmental performance. This lead to an important policy implication: inspection 
should be carried out more thoroughly, but less frequent.  
 Besides spending resources to increase un-inspectability, firms may also invest in 
activities that reduce penalty if it is found in violation. Kambhu (1989) develops a model 
where firms have two spending options: (1) abatement activities, or (2) activities to erode 
penalty if they end up paying. One interesting implication of his model is if the regulator 
attempts to raise the standard, it may have a reverse effect on environmental 
performance. Such unconventional conclusion arises because most of other analyses 
ignore possibility of firms spending resources on penalty-eroding activities (such as 
hiring a good lawyer to increase the probability of winning in the court). When the 
regulator increases environmental standard, it will cause firms to invest more in such 
activities to bring down the liability they should have paid.  
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 In 1998, Kadambe and Segerson developed a model where there is a significant 
interaction between firms and regulator. If the regulator increases the level of penalty, it 
will have direct and indirect effect. They define direct effect as the effect of an increase 
in the fine on the expected cost of a violation holding the probabilities of enforcement-
related decisions constant, whereas indirect effect is defined as the effect of the fine on 
the probability of a violation through its effect on the probabilities of the enforcement 
actions taken by the enforcers. Using comparative static, they show that the direct effect 
is always positive, while the indirect effect is ambiguous. The intuitive explanation for 
the indirect effect is that fines also affect the probabilities of several actions that need to 
be considered in when making a decision whether to comply or violate. Specifically, it 
will affect the likelihood that the regulator will issue an order, then the likelihood that a 
firm would challenge if an order is issued, and finally the likelihood that the regulator 
would fight if the firm decides to challenge. While the effect of fines on probability of the 
regulator to fight a challenge is positive, the signs for the other two effects can not be 
determined, which makes the total effect on compliance becomes ambiguous.  
 
Empirical Research 
Inspection and Enforcement  
 Contrary to theoretical works, results from empirical studies show convergence. 
In spite of differences in the focus of attention and methodology, most of the empirical 
research show positive impact of monitoring and enforcement on subsequent compliance 
behavior. The empirical work which we will review in this section is particularly on the 
environmental context. 
8 
 
 One of the early works on enforcement of environmental regulation is the 
research conducted by Magat and Viscusi (1990). They examine whether EPA’s 
inspection reduce the level of water pollution as well as incentive to violate in the pulp 
and paper industry. Additionally, since there is a requirement for some plants to submit 
monthly DMR (Discharge Monitoring Report), they also perform additional investigation 
to test the effect of incident on DMR non-reporting.  
 Two regressions are estimated using the same explanatory variables. The 
dependent variable of the first regression is pollution level (continuous), while the second 
regression uses dichotomous dependent variable to represent compliance status. Pollution 
level is estimated using ordinary least square (OLS), whereas compliance status is 
estimated using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). To investigate the incident of 
DMR non-reporting, they performed a simple test of difference in means. Among the 
groups of explanatory variables are the distributed lagged of inspections, which they 
employ to test whether the effect of inspection is permanent or just a transitory – i.e., 
whether there would be a rebound effect after an inspection is performed.  
 Using quarterly data (1982:1 – 1985:1) from 170 plants out of 194 with BOD 
(Biological Oxygen Demand) discharge, they find that inspections substantially reduce 
BOD level after about one quarter. The effects are permanent in reducing the firms’ 
future pollution level. Using an interaction term made of inspection variable and 
compliance status, they conclude that inspections do reduce the pollution levels 
irrespective of compliance status. Maximum likelihood estimation also provides similar 
result to those of OLS. Without inspections, noncompliance rate would have been double. 
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While for the incident of DMR non-reporting, they found that inspection is effective in 
reducing the number of DMR non-reporting.  
 A slightly different study is performed by Nadeau (1997). Not only does he make 
a distinction between monitoring and formal action, but he also analyzes the effect on 
duration of noncompliance rather than just the compliance status per se. He uses two-
stage estimation based on the consideration that enforcement and compliance decision are 
made simultaneously. In the first stage he estimated EPA enforcement and monitoring 
activity using Poisson estimation. The predicted values of enforcement and monitoring 
obtained in the first stage are used in the second stage in the survival model.  Using 
quarterly data from 1979:3 to 1989:3, he concludes that EPA is effective in reducing the 
time that plants violate standards. A 10 % increase in monitoring activity leads to a 4.2 % 
reduction in the time that plants violate EPA regulation, while 10 % increase in 
enforcement will reduce length of violation by 4 – 4.7 % 
 Other slightly different works are the research conducted by Deily and Gray 
(1991) and Gray and Deily (1996). Their studies are based on the premise that EPA 
would also consider economic and political impact in carrying out enforcement action. 
Among the impact is plant closing. Theoretically, a plant will choose to close if the 
compliance cost is higher than the expected revenue. Although closing a heavily 
polluting plant is good for environmental quality, local residents may not necessarily like 
this idea when it causes many people loosing their jobs. It implies that if EPA really takes 
into account non environmental factor, any enforcement action should be at the level such 
that it minimizes support loss given a particular target environmental quality. 
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 To test their hypothesis, they choose 49 plants in steel industry as sample of 
observation. This is based on the consideration that the industry was experiencing a 
declining demand. Given this condition, enforcement action directed towards a firm in 
the steel industry will increase the likelihood of plant-closing.  
 They perform two-stage estimation with instrumental variable (IV). In the first 
stage, two equations are estimated, namely (1) enforcement and (2) closing decision. In 
the next stage, the predicted sum of enforcements are used to estimate the plant closing 
decision, while the predicted closing decisions obtain in the first stage, are used to 
estimate the number of enforcement. The enforcement equation in the first stage is 
estimated using linear regression, while plant-closing equation is estimated using logit 
model.  
 They conclude that enforcement behavior is indeed influenced by potential 
adjustment cost to local community. Plants with higher probability of closing (as effect of 
enforcement) will face less enforcement action. And plants with sizeable amount 
employment in the region will also face less enforcement. They find that there is a 
tendency that marginal plants facing less enforcement are concentrated in counties with 
high unemployment. Their results also indicate that plants with more enforcement have a 
higher probability to close. A 12 % increase in the expected enforcement increases the 
probability of closing by 1 percentage point. 
 In their 1996 study, the relationship between enforcement and compliance is 
examined. Probability of closing—which they obtain from their 1991 study--is also 
included in the determining the amount of enforcement. They conclude that enforcement 
actions (in any measures) are statistically significant in affecting plant compliance 
11 
 
decision, and greater compliance leads to less enforcement. Additionally, the plants’ 
future viability and the cost of bringing it into compliance also influence a firm’s 
compliance decision. One surprising result they obtain is that larger plants are less likely 
to comply. Larger plants are less likely to face enforcement, indicating political 
consideration take place in enforcement. They also discover that firms’ characteristic are 
not statistically significant in determining compliance decision, but have significant 
impact on enforcement decision, although the signs are not always as expected.  
Self Reporting 
 In addition to inspection and formal enforcement, topic that has attracted scholars’ 
attention is self-report policy. As the regulator has a budget constrain in enforcing 
environmental regulation, there is a need for a policy that acts as a screening mechanism 
before conducting inspections. One viable option is for facilities to self-report their 
emission level. Some studies that include self-reporting emission are Magat and Viscusi 
(1990), Laplante and Rilstone (1996), and Helland (1998a), and Stafford (2002).  
 Laplante and Rilstone (1996) investigate the impact of inspection of self-reported 
emission level on compliance decision in the pulp and paper industry in Quebec. 
Although similar research has been done by Magat and Viscusi (1990) for U.S. case, their 
study differs in four aspects: (1) The data on standard of emission is available for every 
plant which enable them to see the impact relative to the standard, (2) They take into 
account the endogeneity of inspections, whereas Magat and Viscusi (1990) only use 
lagged of inspections to control for endogeneity, (3) They also take into account the 
selection bias problem created by self-reporting regime, (4) They estimate not only BOD, 
but also TSS (Total Suspended Solid). 
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 In order to test their hypotheses, three types of estimates are performed: (1) Least 
squares regression without controlling for endogeneity and selection bias, (2) IV 
estimation where they control for endogeneity of inspection, (3) Two-step Heckman 
procedure to take into account self-selection. Using monthly data of 46 plants from 
1985:1 – 1990:12, they find that selection bias does exist, where larger plants are more 
likely to self-report. After controlling the self-selection due to reporting and inspection 
endogeneity, they conclude that inspections reduce impact on emission level. One 
interesting result from their study is that the sign of time trend is negative and statistically 
significant in three cases of four. As they contend, “This may be evidence that, apart from 
inspection inducements, there is no effort on the part of plants to reduce their emission 
level.” 
 A slightly different type of self-reporting regime has been implemented by the 
EPA in the beginning of 1996. Under this regime, the amount of penalty is reduced if a 
violating facility reports its violation during self audit. To our knowledge, Helland 
(1998a) is the first to investigate the impact of self-reporting policy of this kind (i.e., self 
report only if violation has occurred). Similar to most of previous enforcement studies, 
the object of research is also pulp industry. He investigates the role of targeting in 
producing regulatory compliance and self-reporting under the Clean Water Act. His 
research was mainly to empirically test Harrington’s (1988) work on targeting.  
 Five hypotheses were tested: (1) The absence of any detected violations in 
previous periods should produce more violations in the contemporaneous period; (2) 
Plants that have detected violations in previous periods are more likely to self-report 
contemporaneous violations; (3) Mills with intermediate compliance cost are more likely 
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to self-report, while higher and lower cost mills are less likely to self-report; (4) To the 
extent that regulators do not target mills, fewer violations will be reported; (5) Mills that 
have had mo detected violations in previous periods are less likely to self-report 
contemporaneous violations.  
 He uses detection controlled estimation model, developed by Feinstein (1990), 
where he estimates three equations: (1) violation, (2) Inspection and (3) Self-report 
decision. The dependent variable used for all equation is discrete variable. He chooses 
quarterly data for 57 mills in EPA region 4 between 1990 and 1993. This region is chosen 
for two reasons; (1) it has highest concentration of pulp and paper mills, and (2) data 
availability.  
 Based on his results, there is no evidence that inspections that do not detect 
violations increase the probability of future violations (inconsistent with Harrington 
paradox). However, he does notice that Harrington model only consistent with a subset of 
paper mills. He also concludes that detecting a violation does make plants more likely to 
self-report a violation. In summary, he contends that targeting produce more cooperation, 
in the form of self-reporting, although it does not deter violations. What targeting does is 
encourage firms to report violations they detect and presumably take steps to correct 
them. 
Penalty  
 Although in the theoretical work penalty has been acknowledged for a long time 
as one policy variable to induce compliance decision, it has not been included in most 
studies for years. During the 90s, there were only two articles that include penalty in their 
analysis; Hamilton (1996), which investigates impact of informal and formal rule in 
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enforcing RCRA regulation, and Kleit et al. (1998) who investigate the factors that 
determine the severity of penalty of water pollution in Louisiana.  
 In Kleit et al. (1998), three groups are included as independent variables; 
environmental performance, legal factors and political factors. The environmental 
performances are measured by count variables (number of previous enforcement action 
and number of excursion), while legal and political factors were represented by dummy 
variables. In order to test their hypothesis, probit and tobit estimation were conducted. In 
the probit estimation, the dependent variable is a discrete choice (whether a plant receives 
a penalty from the Office of Water Resource/OWR, or only a compliance order). 
Meanwhile for tobit estimation, two regressions were performed. The first tobit 
regression uses the initial penalty while the second regression uses the final penalty (i.e. 
the final amount of the penalty determined in the settlement agreement between OWR 
and the respondent).  
 Using monthly data (December 1993 – December 1994) from the Department of 
Environmental Quality, Louisiana, they find that penalties are positively related to 
severity of violations. Firms with previous violations are more likely to get higher 
penalties if they violate again. The largest increase in penalty happens when a facility 
does not have a permit or commit an illegal discharge.  
 Although Hamilton (1996) and Kleit et al. (1998) have brought back penalty into 
environmental compliance study, penalties are treated as dependent variable. Referring to 
Becker’s (1968) seminal work, it is the probability of inspection and the severity of 
penalty that affect decision of committing crime. Therefore, compliance decision should 
be treated as endogenous. 
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 The first article after Feinstein (1989) that discuss penalty with causality direction 
as suggested by Becker (1968) is Stafford (2002). She examines the impact of a change in 
EPA’s penalty regime in 1991 on firms’ compliance. Under the new regime, some 
penalties were increased to 10 or 20 times of the previous penalty level. She uses dummy 
variable to represent the change in regime.   
 To test her hypothesis, she runs two censored probit regressions simultaneously, 
assuming the error terms of violation and inspection equation are positively correlated. 
This is intended to handle the possibility of correlation between unmeasured facilities’ 
characteristics and the likelihood to violate (hence more likely to be inspected). Her 
results are consistent with Becker’s model, where an increase in penalties would lead to 
increase in compliance, ceteris paribus. The estimated increase in the number of 
compliance for 10-fold increase in penalty is between 10 and 20 %.  
 Penalty given to a firm also provides a signal to other firms regarding the 
regulator reputation in enforcing environmental regulation. If the regulator has a good 
reputation, then penalty given to detected violators will have a spillover effect on other 
firms. Other firms will have more incentive to comply if the enforcement threat is real.  
 If the regulator reputation is an important determinant in compliance decision, 
then as Shimshack and Ward (2005) argue, focusing only on the response of the 
sanctioned firm would overestimate the parameter for penalties and other sanction. Based 
on that premise, they conduct a research to find out the effect of three types of 
enforcement actions if the spillover effect is taken into account. The three enforcement 
actions that become the focus of attention are fines, intermediate enforcement action 
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(IEA), and inspection. The regulator reputation (spillover effect) is measured from the 
coefficient of fines and IEAs on other firms (within the same jurisdiction).  
 Their observations consist of major plants in the pulp and paper industry. 
Estimation is performed using Chamberlain’s conditional random effect (CRE) probit 
model.5 The first two finding are not that surprising; (1) that inspection last year have 
statistically significant effect in increasing compliance, and (2) intermediate enforcement 
actions in any measures have no detected impact on compliance decision. What quite 
striking from their research is the last finding; after taking into account the spillover 
effect, self-penalty does not have a significant impact on compliance decision. It is the 
spillover effects which have a statistically significant impact on compliance decision. 
 
Laboratory Experiment 
 An effort to investigate the effect of punishment using laboratory experiment is 
conducted by Anderson and Stafford (2003), where they examine voluntary compliance 
model in providing public goods. Their design models a regulatory regime in which 
compliance is equivalent to contributing to a public good. Although the model is not 
applicable to all types of illegal behavior, they argue that it is still reasonable for 
environmental compliance. For example, installing pollution control equipment is 
analogous to contributing to a public good.  
 In their experiment, if someone is found being a free-rider, he/she will be given a 
penalty and the amount of penalty will depend on the degree of free-riding. The design of 
the experiment allows them to distinguish the effect of increased probability of audit to 
                                                 
5 As Helland (1998a) finds evidence of targeting policy, plant specific effect should be introduced. They 
argue that including fixed effect in a panel probit regression yields inconsistent estimates of the slope 
coefficients. As the solution, they use Chamberlain’s conditional random effect probit model. 
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the increase in severity of punishment. They perform two types of experiment; (1) one-
time and (2) repeated treatment.  
 Their findings are generally consistent with other experimental result. Public good 
provision is increasing as the expected cost of punishment increases. Their result 
indicates that the punishment severity has quantitatively larger effect on compliance 
behavior than the increased probability of punishment (being audited), which is contrary 
to most of the empirical findings. However, they note that the difference might be due to 
the measurement error in the empirical literature. One surprising result is that previous 
punishment has negative rather than positive effect on compliance behavior.6 They note 
that this perhaps due to a ‘lightning does not strike twice’ attitude.  
                                                 
6 The negative effect of previous punishment might not apply in enforcement of environmental regulation. 
In their experiment, audit is performed randomly, which might generate ‘lightning does not strike twice’ 
attitude. By law, EPA is not allowed to perform inspection in a random basis.  
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CHAPTER III 
ESSAY ONE: ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF PENALTIES ON  
REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 
 
Introduction 
 Since the seminal work of Becker (1968) on the economics of crime, economists 
have explored various dimensions of regulatory enforcement. Becker’s framework has 
been applied and extended to myriad types of regulations, including tax and 
environmental regulations.  The environmental regulation literature has focused on the 
relationship between inspections and compliance decisions. For example, see Magat and 
Viscusi (1990), Deily and Grey (1991), Grey and Deily (1996), Laplante and Rilstone 
(1996), Nadeau (1997) and Helland (1998a).  
 Empirical analyses that jointly consider the effect of inspection and penalties on 
compliance are much less common. Two studies (Earnhart 2004, Shimshack and Ward 
2005) include both inspection and penalties in modeling compliance decision, but fail to 
account for undetected violations.7 As Feinstein (1989) noted, when violations can go 
undetected, parameter estimates of enforcement actions can be biased downwards. A 
more recent study (Scholz and Wang 2006) considers the potential for undetected 
violations, but uses a discrete, rather than continuous, penalty measure. Using a discrete 
measure prevents one from discerning responses of minor violators from those of
                                                 
7 There are three other studies that include penalty in their analysis. Hamilton (1996) and Kleit et al. (1998) 
treated penalties as dependent variable rather than independent variable. While it is true that the extent of 
noncompliance affects penalty severity, the literature on economics of crime emphasizes causality in the 
other direction, that the expected penalties affect compliance decision. Other study, Stafford (2002), 
focuses on the impact of penalty regime change, but did not include past penalties to represent specific 
deterrence effect. 
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substantial violators and introduces a form of measurement error that may bias results. 
Additionally, one cannot calculate the change in the probability of noncompliance 
resulting from a percentage change in penalty.   
 Our study improves on previous studies in three important ways. First, we use a 
statistical method that takes into account undetected violations in modeling firms’ 
compliance behavior. Second, we use a continuous measure of penalties. Third, in order 
to avoid omitted variable bias, we use a richer set of covariates than has been used to 
date. We discuss each of these improvements in more detail in the next section. 
Although it may seem obvious that penalties will induce greater compliance, 
recent theoretical work has pointed out that the effect of penalties on compliance can be 
ambiguous because firms may invest in penalty-eroding activities instead of pollution 
abatement technologies (Kambhu 1989; Kadambe and Segerson 1998).  Moreover, 
assigning penalties for environmental noncompliance is legally more complicated than 
assigning such penalties in other policy areas, such as tax noncompliance, and thus the 
impact of penalties may be small.  Indeed, our results imply that although the effect of 
penalties is statistically significant in reducing noncompliance, the effect is not 
economically significant.  Compliance is affected more by a facility’s characteristics and 
previous compliance status than by penalties or other enforcement actions. 
 
Contribution to Literature 
Undetected Violations 
 To take into account undetected violations, we use the Detection Controlled 
Estimation (DCE) approach, developed by Feinstein (1989, 1990).  In the environmental 
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compliance literature, three studies employ DCE analysis (Brehm and Hamilton 1996; 
Helland 1998a; Scholz and Wang 2006). We use a two-sided expectation simultaneity 
DCE approach (developed in Feinsten 1990) because we assume that potential violators 
will take into account what the regulator would do, and vice versa. No published 
compliance study in any field has employed the two-sided expectation approach. 
Penalty Measure 
 Studies that model penalty as an explanatory variable usually use a dummy or 
count variable to represent the penalty (for instance, see Stafford 2002; Earnhart 2004; 
Scholz and Wang 2006). In contrast, Shimshack and Ward (2005) use a continuous 
penalty measure, but they fail to address undetected violations. Feinstein (1989) 
addresses undetected violations, but measures penalty at the facility level with a dummy 
variable and at the industry-level with an aggregate (national) continuous measures of 
industry-level penalties.8  
 A discrete measure for penalty represents a form of measurement error. Classical 
errors-in-variables (CEV) leads to attenuation bias and inconsistency of penalty 
parameter estimates (Griliches 1986; Greene 1997; Wooldridge 2002). This measurement 
error is transmitted to other variables in the model, but the direction of the bias is 
unknown. For non-linear models, such as probit and logit, Carroll et al. (1984) show that 
whenever the measurement errors are severe and the sample size is large, “[T]he usual 
estimate of the probability of the event in question can be substantially in error.” 
Moreover, the impact of measurement errors on the estimated coefficient can be 
                                                 
8 Feinstein (1989) use two deterrence variables: (1) plant sanction, measured by dummy variable, (2) 
aggregate sanction in industry, measured by the 3-months moving average of industry fines.  Given that a 
facility-level fine will have a greater impact than an industry-level moving average, we believe measuring 
penalties as a continuous variable at the facility-level is important.  
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magnified by some transformations, such as when the true model includes a quadratic 
function of the variable measured with error (Griliches 1986).” 
Covariates  
 We incorporate covariates that have been found to be important in previous 
studies, but which have yet not been assessed jointly.  For example, we include regulator 
reputation to incorporate general deterrence effects, intermediate enforcement actions 
(IEA) to represent enforcement with zero penalties, facility industrial type to account for 
inherent differences on the propensity to violate.9  By jointly assessing all variables that 
have been found to be important in previous studies, we reduce the likelihood of bias 
from omitted variables.  
  We focus on water pollution because of the high degree of consistency in data 
collection of this outcome by federal and state agencies. The period of analysis is 1997– 
2004 based on two considerations. First, it contains one penalty regime.10 Second, we 
expect that using more recent data would give us more accurate estimates of the facilities’ 
response to enforcement action.11 The facilities included in this study are major facilities 
listed in the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). We do not 
restrict observations to a single industry, as some other studies have done (e.g., 
Shimshack and Ward 2005; Helland 1998a; Earnhart 2004; Nadeau 1997).12  
 
                                                 
9 Most of the regulatory compliance studies focus only on one industrial type.  
 
10 There was a regime change in 1995 which instructed the EPA to reduce the penalty if the violating 
facility self-reports the violation. 
 
11 The reliability of pre-1995 penalty data is questionable. Helland (1998b) indicates that there appear to 
have been no systematic effort to track penalty records in the NPDES database before 1995. 
 
12 Estimation of a DCE model requires sufficient variation in the detection equation, and thus including 
multiple industries in our sample also serves the purpose of increasing such variability.   
22 
 
Methodology 
Empirical Model 
 To account for undetected violations, the empirical estimation is performed using 
Feinstein’s (1989, 1990) Detection Controlled Estimation (DCE). There are three 
decisions that are estimated jointly:  violations, inspection, and self report.  Thus we use a 
modified DCE, as used in Helland (1998a) and Scholz and Wang (2006). The way we 
categorize observations in the modified DCE is described in figure 1. The likelihood 
function of the modified DCE is explained in the appendix. 
 Furthermore, there are possibilities that potential violators take into account what 
the regulator will do, vice versa.  Thus we also estimate the model using a two-sided 
expectation simultaneity version of the modified DCE.  We also estimate the model using 
probit and Chamberlain conditional random effects probit (CRE) to provide a comparison 
of results under different assumptions (i.e., when we ignore undetected violations).   
 We estimate three decisions jointly: violation and self report decisions, which are 
made by facilities, and inspection decisions, which are made by the regulator. Each 
decision is measured by dummy variable. In the violation decision, a dependent variable 
equal to 1 indicates that the facility is in violation, while zero indicates the facility is in 
compliance. The same logic applies for the inspection and self report decisions, where 1 
indicates the presence of inspection or a self-reported violation. Our violation equation 
describes the decision to commit an effluent violation.13 
                                                 
13 We use both measures of effluent violation in the NPDES database; (1) monthly average, and (2) non 
monthly average, which reflects the maximum amount read during the reporting period. As a robustness 
check, we also use “significant violations,” which comprise effluent violations, compliance schedule 
violations, compliance schedule monitoring report violations, and non receipt of Discharge Monitoring 
Report (DMR). The results are qualitatively similar in general. 
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 We model facility’s violation decision as a function of lagged penalty and 
intermediate enforcement actions (IEA), regulator’s reputation, previous inspection 
outcome, demographic characteristic, and probability of inspection. IEAs are all 
enforcement actions without monetary fines.  Lagged penalty and IEAs are included to 
capture specific deterrence effects. To capture general deterrence effects, we include 
regulator reputation, which is measured by the average penalty and average IEA in the 
state (Shimshack and Ward 2005). Demographic characteristics of the communities near 
the facility are also included. 
 Inspection is modeled as a function of the lagged number of inspections, lagged 
compliance status, lagged penalties, demographic characteristics of neighboring 
communities, state government environmental expenditures,14 number of facilities (in the 
same 2-digit SIC) in the state, and a facility’s probability of violation. Lagged inspection, 
compliance status, and penalties represent a facility’s record of enforcement and 
compliance. Government expenditures and the number of facilities capture the regulator’s 
enforcement resources.  Demographic characteristics of neighboring communities are 
also included.  
 A facility’s decision to self-report is modeled as a function of lagged compliance 
status, lagged penalty, lagged intermediate enforcement actions, lagged report violation 
and the number of facilities in the same 2-digit SIC code in the region.  
                                                 
14 For government budget, we use the state expenditure for environmental and natural resources 
(normalized by the total number of facility)  
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 In each decision, we also include a facility’s industrial type,15 and seasonal 
dummies to account for inherent differences in the propensity to violate across firms and 
time. Additionally, since the estimation procedure in the CRE also includes average 
variables of the most direct theoretical concern (which are used to condition the error 
term), the estimation in DCE (and probit) should also use the same conditioning variables 
to be comparable. The summary of expected of sign for each variable in each decision is 
described in Table 1.16 We estimate the model under five specifications, A to E. A 
summary of each specification is described in Table 3. 
Identification 
 A two-sided simultaneous DCE model requires three conditions for identification: 
1. We need explanatory variables that are uniquely associated with each stage. 
Previous inspection outcome (i.e., inspection that did not detect violations) only 
exists in the violation decision. We exclude it from inspection equation since we 
consider that the regulator is more concerned on the extent of violation, and this 
information can still be obtained even in the absence of inspection (through self 
report violation). Since self report is intended to reduce the maximum penalty, 
and many violators go only with warning, we may expect that previous inspection 
that did not detect any violation does not have any effect on self report. Thus, we 
exclude it from self report decision. Number of previous inspections and 
government expenditures exist only in the inspection equation.  They do no affect 
                                                 
15 The industrial types in NPDES represent facilities’ SIC and ownership. There are five industrial types 
used in the NPDES database; (1) primary industry on effluent limitation guidelines/ELG, (2) non-primary 
industry but listed on ELG, (3) industry not listed on ELG, (4) municipal facilities, which is determined by 
SIC 4952 and public ownership, and (5) facilities without classification.  
 
16 The argument of each decision is available in the appendix 
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violation decisions because they are unrelated to compliance costs and have no 
direct effect on facilities.  They affect facilities only through the probability of 
inspection. The regulator’s decision to perform inspection depends on previous 
inspections as well as the regulator’s resource availability. As in Helland (1998a), 
we use lagged detected violation as exclusion restriction for self report decision.  
2. Given that our explanatory variables include both discrete and continuous 
variables, we must have at least one explanatory variable with an unbounded 
support.  Penalty and regulator reputation are two examples of variables that have 
unbounded support. 
3. For a two-sided expectation simultaneity model to have a solution, the sign of the 
endogenous right hand side variable must differ between models. As noted above, 
we expect a negative relationship between expected inspections and the violation 
decision, and a positive relationship between expected violation rates and the 
inspection decision. Whether or not these signs differ in practice must be 
determined empirically. 
 
Data  
 Data come from the EPA, Census Bureau, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We use the NPDES data set from the EPA to 
obtain facility information, compliance records, and histories of inspection and 
enforcement performed by state and federal agencies. While inspection and enforcement 
histories include the exact date of action, compliance records are only available quarterly. 
Consequently, we can not extend the analysis beyond quarterly data.  For data 
26 
 
consistency consideration, we only include major facilities in the analysis.17 County-level 
demographic characteristics come from the 1990 and 2000 Decennial Censuses. Monthly 
employment rates come from Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) of the BLS. 
We calculate quarterly unemployment rates by taking the average of the four months. All 
datasets are merged using Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) county codes. 
  We vary the set of industries used in the estimation to see if the results change 
drastically with different datasets. In the first dataset, we include all municipal and non-
municipal facilities from all SICs, which has never been done in an environmental 
compliance study. The second dataset includes only non-municipal facilities. We perform 
regression using the second dataset based on two considerations. First, Scholz and Wang 
(2006) claim that municipal facilities have different budget constraints that may alter 
their responses to enforcement actions. Second, municipal facilities account for a 
relatively larger proportion of violations in the first dataset: (1) 74% of the penalty 
actions are assigned to municipal facilities, (2) 58% of total value of penalties is imposed 
on municipal facilities, and (3) 63% of the observations in the first dataset are municipal 
facilities. The third dataset includes facilities in SIC 49 (gas, utilities and sanitary 
services) because facilities in this SIC code are the most frequent violators.  
 One interesting fact about the NPDES database is that there are many records 
where facilities are in violation, yet no inspections or enforcements take place in the same 
quarter. These observations reflect the option that firms have to self-report 
noncompliance.  The EPA requires major plants to submit a monthly Discharge 
                                                 
17 Major facilities are required to submit monthly discharge monitoring report (DMR), and by law, must be 
inspected at least once a year. On the other hand, minor facilities are not required to submit monthly DMR, 
nor required to be inspected at least once a year. Thus, including minor facilities will increase the number 
observations with missing information. 
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Monitoring Report (DMR) and a 1995 regulatory change provides incentives (through 
penalty reductions) for self-reporting violations. 
 Although self-reports provide information regarding firms’ compliance status, 
they may also be subject to strategic nonreporting. Two studies fail to reject the accuracy 
of self-reports and thus ignore this source of bias in studying compliance decisions 
(Laplante and Rilstone 1996; Shimshack and Ward 2005).  In a DCE approach, however, 
the self-report decision is included in the joint likelihood function and thus any strategic 
non-reporting is directly controlled in the modeling.  
 
Analyses and Results 
Violations 
 The results in Tables 4, 5 and 6 indicate that facilities respond to penalties. The 
negative coefficient indicates that the larger the amount of penalty, the greater the 
likelihood that the facility will comply in the next period.  The coefficient of penalty 
lagged one year is greater than penalty lagged two years. 
 Interestingly, facilities with IEAs in the previous year are more likely to remain in 
violation in the next period, while plants with IEAs two years ago will be more likely to 
comply. The positive coefficient for IEAs lagged one year indicates that facilities find it 
difficult to correct violations.18 In the event that the facility is still unable to correct the 
violation, it will submit self report to avoid severe penalty.19 The change in coefficient 
                                                 
18 Shimshack and Ward (2005) is the only study that includes IEA into analysis. The qualitative signs for 
self IEA are similar with their result, but they do not find it significant.  
 
19 This is supported by the result in self report equation, where there is a positive correlation between 
lagged IEAs (1-4 quarters) and self report decisions. See Table 8 for detail. 
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sign from IEAs lagged one year to IEAs lagged two years is not surprising. This may 
reflect the regulator’s enforcement cycle length,20 and may indicate that facilities are 
concerned that extended periods of violation will result in higher penalties because 
regulators will perceive the facilities as failing to act in “good faith.” 
 Regulator reputation, whether measured by the average penalty or the number of 
IEAs per facility in the state, also improves compliance. In contrast to Shimshack and 
Ward (2005), introducing reputation variables does not change the effectiveness of self-
penalty or self IEAs.  Only two variables change in magnitude or significance. The 
unemployment rate coefficient changes from positive to negative, and, under the DCE 
model, the percentage of owner occupants becomes statistically insignificant. 
 With regard to the coefficient on previous compliance status, we find that 
previous inspection that did not detect violation is associated with higher likelihood to 
violate in the next year. This is consistent with Harrington (1988) prediction for firms 
with medium compliance cost. However, note the support for Harrington prediction is not 
as strong as one might expect, as the coefficient for lagged 5-8 quarters is negative. 
Moreover, the number of previous violation is positive correlated with current violation.  
 The sign of demographic characteristics are mostly as expected, except for 
unemployment rate and share of white population. In most models and specifications, the 
coefficient of unemployment is negative in the violation equation. Although this seems 
surprising, Shimshack and Ward (2005) also estimate a negative coefficient. Their 
explanation for such result is that high levels of unemployment result in an increased 
community sensitivity to plants’ polluting and social behavior.  
                                                 
20 There are some indications that the enforcement cycle is two years: (1) coefficients of reputation 
variables lagged two years in the violation equation are larger than those lagged one year, (2) coefficients 
of inspection lagged two years are larger than those lagged one year in the inspection equation.  
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Inspection 
 Table 7 presents the results from the inspection equation.  Six variables have the 
expected signs and statistical significance across specifications: (1) lagged penalty, (2) 
lagged IEAs, (3) lagged inspection, (4) number of facility in the same 2-digit SIC code, 
(5) percentage of urban area, and (6) percentage of owner occupant. Positive signs on 
lagged inspection are not surprising because major facilities are required to be inspected 
once a year. We find that the regulator has greater likelihood to inspect plants in 
industries (2-digit SIC) with larger numbers of facilities. We expected this relationship 
because total pollution will increase and the net benefit of performing inspection towards 
the industry increases as the number of plant in the industry increases. The results from 
self report equation (see below) also confirm that plants in industry with smaller number 
of facilities are more likely to self report. In three specifications (A, B, and D), we find 
evidence that the regulator’s decision to perform inspections is affected by the racial 
structure:  inspections are more likely in communities with a higher percentage of white 
citizens. Scholz and Wang (2006) find a similar relationship.21  
Self Report 
 Table 8 presents the results from the self-report equation. The results are mostly 
as expected. Interestingly, we find that probability of inspection and regulator reputation 
are negatively correlated with facility’s decision to self report. Looking at the sign of the 
probability of inspection in the violation decision, it is not surprising that we have 
negative coefficient on the self report decision. The facility that has higher likelihood of 
                                                 
21 They used different measure of race structure. They found that greater percentages of Hispanic and Black 
residents are associated with lower inspection probabilities.  
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being inspected is more likely to comply, thus there is no need to submit self report. The 
possible explanation for negative coefficient for regulator reputation is that the penalty 
reduction in the state where the regulator is strict is not large enough. Therefore, by not 
submitting self report violation, a facility has a chance of avoiding the penalty.  
Marginal Effects  
 Our models are non-linear, which means that the coefficients cannot be 
interpreted as marginal effects. In order to discern the relative importance of each 
variable, we calculate the change of probability of violation when one variable is changed 
by given value, holding the other variables constant at their mean values. The results are 
presented in Tables 9 (probit model) and 10 (DCE model). 
 For self-penalty, we measure the change in the predicted probability of violation 
with a change from zero to $19,799 in the penalty (i.e., the mean of non-zero penalties 
lagged one year). Under the probit model, a facility that was fined by $19,799 last year is 
1.00 to 1.26% less likely to violate than the facility that did not receive monetary fines.  
The estimates under DCE are higher, ranging from 2.75 to 3.54% (Table 10).  
 Imposing a penalty on one facility will also have indirect effects on other facilities 
through a change in the regulator’s reputation. A change from $0 penalty to a $19,799 
penalty on a firm implies, on average, a $139 increase in the penalty reputation variable 
(lagged one year).22 Under the probit model, if the average penalty in the state increased 
                                                 
22 Adding $19,799 to aggregate penalty and then divide it with number of facility in the state gives us an 
average of $139 increase in reputation penalty. 
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by $139 last year, each facility is approximately 0.01% less likely to violate. Under the 
DCE model, the reduction in the probability of violation is between 0.02% and 0.04%.23 
 The change in predicted probability of violation caused by an increase in IEAs is 
based on one unit increase of IEA. Similar to penalty, we also calculate the change of 
predicted probability of violation due to one unit increase of regulator reputation for 
IEAs. Tables 9 and 10 show that an additional IEA in the last four quarters is not 
associated with a lower probability of violation. A reduction in the probability of 
violation due to an additional IEA can only be seen after 5-8 quarters. 
 The fact that penalty increases do not generate substantial reductions in the 
probability of violation is not surprising for two reasons. First, penalties are rarely 
imposed on detected violators. Second, even if a detected violator is fined, the amount is 
usually small (as noted above, the mean is less than $20,000).  
 The rarity of severe monetary sanctions by the EPA is partially due to large 
litigation costs. The 1995 CWA penalty settlement formula supports this argument, 
where litigation costs act as penalty-reducing factor. Theoretically, imposing large 
penalties increases the probability that the facility will challenge the decision in judicial 
courts, as shown by Kambhu (1989) and Kadambe and Segerson (1998). Kambhu (1989) 
contends that increases in penalties may cause firms to invest more in penalty-eroding 
activities instead of investing in abatement technologies.  One form of penalty-eroding 
activity is hiring a good lawyer to increase the probability of winning the case in court. 
Kadambe and Segerson (1998) contend that penalty increases have indirect effects, where 
                                                 
23 We also calculate the impact of $19,799 increase in penalty reputation. We find that the marginal effect 
of penalty reputation is 0.49%-0.67% for lagged 1 year, and 1.01%-1.34% for lagged 2 years.  
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by they change the violator’s probability to challenge the regulator’s decision, and 
consequently change the regulator’s probability to fight the violator’s challenge.  
 One may also argue that our failure to model a penalty equation contributes to the 
small estimated response from penalties.24 We believe the potential for bias in this 
direction is small. First, even if we were to model the penalty decision, as long as there is 
no penalty expectation in the violation equation, the coefficients in the violation equation 
will remain the same. This is because the number of detected and undetected violation 
does not change and the explanatory variable in the violation decision remains 
unchanged. Consequently, the marginal effect in the violation decision would be the 
same. Second, if we were to model the penalty decision and we add a penalty expectation 
in the violation equation, theoretically the coefficients of the penalty expectation will be 
negative. If this is the case, then omitting the penalty expectation implies that other 
coefficients would be biased downward.  In our case, self-penalty has a negative impact.  
Thus a downward bias means that the absolute value of our estimated coefficient of self-
penalty in the compliance equation is larger than the true coefficient. Hence including 
penalty expectation in the violation decision would cause the coefficient of self-penalty to 
be closer to zero.25  
Non-municipal Facilities 
 As noted previously, municipal facilities comprise a proportionally large part of 
our sample and thus may greatly influence our parameter estimates. Although dummy 
variables indicate that non-municipal facilities have lower overall likelihood to violate, 
                                                 
24 As a robustness check, we added a penalty equation in the DCE model, but the model failed to converge. 
 
25 For further discussion on the consequence of ignoring simultaneity among decisions, see Brehm and 
Hamilton (1996). 
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we are also interested in the effect of each covariate in affecting compliance decisions. 
Therefore, we re-estimate the model using just non-municipal facilities. 
 Table 11 presents the results. In general, the results are qualitatively similar with 
the results shown in Table 6. The most notable difference is on the statistical significance 
of self penalty and IEA, where we fail to reject null for lagged 5-8 quarters of self-
penalty and IEA.   
SIC 49 
 We also re-estimate the model for facilities in SIC 49 because this industry is the 
most frequent violator. Table 12 presents the results. We find that self-penalty and 
regulator reputation are effective in deterring violation in every specification. 
Undetected Violations  
 The DCE approach also allows one to estimate the probability of undetected 
violations. We estimate the predicted probability of undetected violation within facilities 
that are not inspected or do not submit self-reports of a violation. Such information can 
be useful in evaluating the effectiveness of a regulatory regime and in improving the 
targeting of inspections.  
Table 13 presents the results. During the entire period of 1997-2004, the average 
predicted probability of undetected effluent violations in municipal facilities is 16.5% 
(Specification E).  In other words, 16.5% of facilities that were not inspected or did not 
submit self-reports of a violation are estimated to have been in violation.  This is higher 
than the non-municipal facilities in the primary industries (11.79%). The probability of 
undetected violation for SIC 49 is close to that of municipal facilities (15.74%), which is 
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not surprising because the majority of facilities in SIC 49 are owned by municipal 
governments.  
 We cannot find a comparison for our estimates in the environmental compliance 
studies, as previous studies do not provide such estimates. However, the estimates of 
undetected violations in the tax literature can be used for parallel comparison. For 
instance, Erard and Ho (2001) estimates the number of non filers in tax year 1988 is 7.9 
millions 1988. This is equivalent to 7.18% of the total filers (7.9/110). Out of 7.9 millions 
non filers, 71% are estimated to have tax liability by the amount of $11 billions, which is 
15% of total overall tax gap (11/73).26 Other studies such as Feinstein (1991) and IRS 
(2006) focus on the extent of tax evasion but did not provide the estimated number of 
violating taxpayers.  
 
Conclusion and Policy Implication 
Conclusion 
 To ascertain the effect of financial penalties and other enforcement actions on 
compliance behavior, we used three estimation methods under various specifications and 
data restrictions.  Most results imply that penalties are effective in deterring violations, 
have an effect on compliance less than one year after the penalty is applied, and continue 
to have an effect up to two years later.  In contrast, intermediate enforcement actions 
(IEAs) do not improve compliance within one year of being applied, but do have an 
effect five to eight quarters later. 
                                                 
26 Tax gap is the standard term used in tax compliance literature to reflects the extent to which taxpayers do 
not file their tax return and pay the correct tax on time. 
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 Our results also demonstrate that the estimated effects of penalties and IEAs on 
facility compliance based on traditional econometric methods are biased towards zero 
because they fail to account for undetected violations.  However, although the estimated 
marginal effects of penalties using the DCE model are two to three times the effects from 
a probit model, they remain economically small.  Compliance decisions are affected more 
by the facility’s characteristics and previous compliance status than penalties and IEAs. 
With regard to the reputation of regulators in a state, measured by the average 
penalty and average IEA per facility in the state, such reputation does improve 
compliance. However, like penalties on specific firms, the reputational effects remain 
economically small. In contrast to Shimshack and Ward (2005), we find that the inclusion 
of regulators’ reputations in the compliance equation does not render the effects of own 
penalties statistically insignificant.27  The probability of inspection can be considered 
another component of regulator reputation and we find that increasing the probability of 
inspection by 17% (one standard deviation) has a moderate effect on compliance. 
 In the inspection decision, we found evidence that the regulator tends to perform 
inspections on those who have a previous record of violation. Holding everything else 
constant, facilities that were penalized or given IEAs have a higher likelihood of being 
inspected in the current period.  Results from the inspection equation estimates also 
provide some evidence of environmental injustice. We found inspections were more 
likely in facilities whose surrounding areas had higher proportions of white citizens and 
owner occupants (note, however, that compliance was negatively correlated with the 
proportion of whites).  
                                                 
27  The sole exception is the regression (Table 11) that uses only non-municipal firms.  Note that our results 
do hold, however, when we use facilities from SIC code 26 (pulp and paper), which is the sample used by 
Shimshack and Ward (2005).  
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Policy Implications 
 Our results indicate that penalties do reduce noncompliance with environmental 
regulations. However, marginal increases in the penalties applied under the existing 
regime will not generate substantial reductions in the probability of violation. The 
absence of a substantial response to penalties arises from the way in which regulators 
enforce the Clean Water Act:  penalties are rarely imposed or, if imposed, are typically 
small. 
 We argue that if regulators want to see economically significant effects from 
penalties, they should consider a nonmarginal change in the penalty regime; specifically, 
they should greatly increase the frequency and severity of penalties.28 Based on our 
results, we believe a large change in the penalty regime will affect facility behavior in 
three ways. First, it will have a specific deterrence effect. Second, it will increase the 
enforcement reputation of the regulator. Third, it increases the probability that facilities 
will self-report violations. A greater frequency of self-reported violations allows for more 
efficient use of inspection budgets.  Inspections can be targeted to facilities that have high 
likelihood of violating, based on observable characteristics, but that do not self report 
violation. Although we cannot precisely predict the effects of a nonmarginal change in 
the penalty regime, Stafford (2002) found that facilities were 3% less likely to violate 
                                                 
28 Under the existing regime, we need a significantly large penalty increase to generate an economically 
significant impact on compliance decisions. However, because our models are non-linear, marginal effects 
of a significantly large penalty increase would far from accurate. 
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after the RCRA penalty regime change in 1990, which increased some penalties 10 to 20 
times their previous levels. 
 The regulator can also improve compliance rates by harnessing a facility’s 
sensitivity to local community characteristics.  We find that education levels in the 
communities surrounding a facility are negatively correlated with violations. Thus, as 
noted by other authors (Foulon et al. 2002; Fung and O’Rourken, 2000; and Khanna and 
Damon 1999), the public disclosure of facilities’ environmental performances to local 
communities can provide additional incentives for facilities to comply with existing 
regulations.
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Table 1. Expected Signs of Empirical Model 
Expected Sign  
Violation Inspection Self Report 
Probability of inspection -  -/+ 
Probability of violation  +  
Probability of self report  -  
Lagged penalty (Self)  - + + 
Lagged penalty (Reputation)  -  + 
Lagged IEA (Self)  - + + 
Lagged IEA (Reputation)  -  + 
Inspected and no violation detected (Lagged) +   
Inspected and violation was detected (Lagged)   + 
Percent urban + +  
Percent white - +  
Unemployment rate + +  
Percent of owner occupant - +  
Percent of bachelor + graduate degree - -/+  
Average penalty + +  
Average IEA + +  
Average inspection +   
Lagged inspection  -  
Lagged number of violation   + + 
Budget per facility  +  
Number of facility in the same 2-digit SIC  + - 
Lagged number of reporting violation    + 
Primary industry - + + 
Not primary industry -/+ -/+ -/+ 
Not on ELG -/+ -/+ -/+ 
Facility with no classification -/+ -/+ -/+ 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Enforcement with Non-Zero Penalty 
Frequency Total Penalty Classification  
  Total % Total % 
Average Penalty 
  
Municipal 1556 74.24%  19,944,746  58.24%                 12,818  
Primary industry listed on ELG 408 19.47%  11,163,982  32.60%                 27,363  
Listed on ELG but not primary industry 69 3.29%    2,385,928  6.97%                 34,579  
Not listed on ELG 63 3.01%       748,769  2.19%                 11,885  
Total 2096 100%  34,243,421  100%                 16,338  
  
Table 3: Empirical Model Specifications 
 Base Reputation 
Variables 
Expectation 
Term 
Time Effects 
Specification A √    
Specification B √ √   
Specification C √ √ √  
Specification D √ √  √ 
Specification E √ √ √ √ 
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Table 4: Effluent Violation Decision under Probit 
Specification 
  A B C D E 
Probability of inspection        -0.0640      -0.0115   
         (0.0743)      (0.0716)   
Penalty (Self) 1-4 quarters ago -0.0185 *** -0.0179 *** -0.0178 *** -0.0157 *** -0.0157 *** 
  (0.0032)  (0.0032)   (0.0032)   (0.0032)   (0.0032)   
Penalty (Self) 5-8 quarters ago -0.0127 *** -0.0115 *** -0.0116 *** -0.0094 *** -0.0095 *** 
  (0.0034)  (0.0034)   (0.0034)   (0.0034)   (0.0034)   
Penalty (Reputation) 1-4 quarters ago    -0.0031   -0.0029   -0.0035   -0.0034   
     (0.0023)   (0.0023)   (0.0024)   (0.0024)   
Penalty (Reputation) 5-8 quarters ago    -0.0108 *** -0.0105 *** -0.0110 *** -0.0109 *** 
     (0.0024)   (0.0024)   (0.0024)   (0.0024)   
IEA (Self) 1-4 quarters ago 0.0115 *** 0.0184 *** 0.0186 *** 0.0157 *** 0.0157 *** 
  (0.0033)  (0.0036)   (0.0036)   (0.0036)   (0.0036)   
IEA (Self) 5-8 quarters ago -0.0267 *** -0.0156 *** -0.0156 *** -0.0184 *** -0.0185 *** 
  (0.0036)  (0.0037)   (0.0037)   (0.0038)   (0.0038)   
IEA (Reputation) 1-4 quarters ago    -0.0086 ** -0.0087 ** -0.0046   -0.0045   
     (0.0042)   (0.0042)   (0.0042)   (0.0042)   
IEA (Reputation) 5-8 quarters ago    -0.0319 *** -0.0316 *** -0.0346 *** -0.0346 *** 
     (0.0044)   (0.0045)   (0.0045)   (0.0045)   
Inspected and no violation detected 1-4 quarters ago 0.0653 *** 0.0730 *** 0.0728 *** 0.0709 *** 0.0708 *** 
  (0.0129)  (0.0129)   (0.0129)   (0.0130)   (0.0130)   
Inspected and no violation detected 5-8 quarters ago 0.0140  0.0207   0.0240 * 0.0154   0.0155   
  (0.0132)  (0.0132)   (0.0139)   (0.0132)   (0.0139)   
Number of effluent violation 1-4 quarters ago 0.6376 *** 0.6294 *** 0.6295 *** 0.6278 *** 0.6277 *** 
  (0.0060)  (0.0060)   (0.0060)   (0.0061)   (0.0061)   
Number of effluent violation 5-8quarters ago 0.0733 *** 0.0649 *** 0.0657 *** 0.0778 *** 0.0780 *** 
  (0.0067)  (0.0067)   (0.0068)   (0.0068)   (0.0069)   
Percent urban -0.0136  -0.0160   -0.0146   -0.0059   -0.0041   
  (0.0277)  (0.0278)   (0.0279)   (0.0278)   (0.0279)   
Percent white 0.4891 *** 0.3124 *** 0.3212 *** 0.2381 *** 0.2434 *** 
  (0.0452)  (0.0466)   (0.0469)   (0.0473)   (0.0475)   
Unemployment rate -0.0046 * -0.0089 *** -0.0091 *** -0.0031   -0.0032   
  (0.0028)  (0.0028)   (0.0028)   (0.0030)   (0.0030)   
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Specification 
  A B C D E 
Percent of owner occupant -0.3662 *** -0.1670 ** -0.1634 * 0.0673   0.0722   
  (0.0832)  (0.0848)   (0.0849)   (0.0880)   (0.0882)   
Percent of bachelor + graduate degree -0.8159 *** -0.9303 *** -0.9370 *** -0.5282 *** -0.5356 *** 
  (0.1243)  (0.1259)   (0.1261)   (0.1320)   (0.1326)   
Primary industry -0.1817 *** -0.1670 *** -0.1697 *** -0.1699 *** -0.1709 *** 
  (0.0136)  (0.0136)   (0.0139)   (0.0137)   (0.0139)   
Not primary industry -0.0943 *** -0.0862 *** -0.0884 *** -0.0820 *** -0.0826 *** 
  (0.0231)  (0.0231)   (0.0232)   (0.0231)   (0.0232)   
Not on ELG -0.0176  -0.0174   -0.0226   -0.0150   -0.0186   
  (0.0260)  (0.0261)   (0.0263)   (0.0262)   (0.0264)   
Facility with no classification -0.0567  -0.1097   -0.1109   -0.0933   -0.0932   
  (0.2418)  (0.2413)   (0.2413)   (0.2408)   (0.2408)   
Average penalty 0.0434 *** 0.0467 *** 0.0470 *** 0.0449 *** 0.0450 *** 
  (0.0026)  (0.0027)   (0.0027)   (0.0027)   (0.0027)   
Average IEA 0.2087 *** 0.3190 *** 0.3185 *** 0.3334 *** 0.3341 *** 
  (0.0228)  (0.0240)   (0.0241)   (0.0242)   (0.0242)   
Average inspection -0.0167  -0.0109   0.0076   -0.0132   -0.0099   
  (0.0119)  (0.0117)   (0.0242)   (0.0118)   (0.0240)   
Constant -2.0730 *** -1.9481 *** -1.9491 *** -1.9382 *** -1.9446 *** 
  (0.0757)   (0.0771)   (0.0776)   (0.0831)   (0.0833)   
Seasonal dummies and time effects are omitted for brevity 
*, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively 
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Table 5: Effluent Violation Decision under Chamberlain Conditional Random Effects 
  Specification 
  A B D 
Penalty (Self) 1-4 quarters ago -0.0133 *** -0.0132 *** -0.0112 *** 
  (0.0034)  (0.0034)   (0.0034)   
Penalty (Self) 5-8 quarters ago -0.0100 *** -0.0092 ** -0.0072 ** 
  (0.0036)  (0.0036)   (0.0036)   
Penalty (Reputation) 1-4 quarters ago    -0.0033   -0.0036   
     (0.0027)   (0.0027)   
Penalty (Reputation) 5-8 quarters ago    -0.0098 *** -0.0103 *** 
     (0.0027)   (0.0027)   
IEA (Self) 1-4 quarters ago 0.0251 *** 0.0326 *** 0.0295 *** 
  (0.0036)  (0.0038)   (0.0038)   
IEA (Self) 5-8 quarters ago -0.0119 *** -0.0020   -0.0051   
  (0.0038)  (0.0040)   (0.0040)   
IEA (Reputation) 1-4 quarters ago    -0.0158 *** -0.0113 ** 
     (0.0046)   (0.0046)   
IEA (Reputation) 5-8 quarters ago    -0.0282 *** -0.0308 *** 
     (0.0050)   (0.0050)   
Inspected and no violation detected 1-4 quarters ago 0.0541 *** 0.0591 *** 0.0567 *** 
  (0.0145)  (0.0145)   (0.0145)   
Inspected and no violation detected 5-8 quarters ago 0.0014  0.0062   0.0015   
  (0.0149)  (0.0148)   (0.0148)   
Number of effluent violation 1-4 quarters ago 0.4981 *** 0.4983 *** 0.5034 *** 
  (0.0072)  (0.0073)   (0.0073)   
Number of effluent violation 5-8quarters ago -0.0417 *** -0.0423 *** -0.0239 *** 
  (0.0077)  (0.0078)   (0.0079)   
Percent urban -0.0129  -0.0198   -0.0034   
  (0.0463)  (0.0452)   (0.0444)   
Percent white 0.7630 *** 0.5621 *** 0.3947 *** 
  (0.0755)  (0.0754)   (0.0764)   
Unemployment rate -0.0099 *** -0.0144 *** -0.0067 * 
  (0.0037)  (0.0037)   (0.0040)   
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  Specification 
  A B D 
Percent of owner occupant -0.6602 *** -0.4416 *** 0.0071   
  (0.1367)  (0.1348)   (0.1414)   
Percent of bachelor + graduate degree -1.5627 *** -1.6296 *** -0.8895 *** 
  (0.1992)  (0.1963)   (0.2082)   
Primary industry -0.2691 *** -0.2463 *** -0.2459 *** 
  (0.0232)  (0.0227)   (0.0223)   
Not primary industry -0.1391 *** -0.1292 *** -0.1206 *** 
  (0.0401)  (0.0390)   (0.0384)   
Not on ELG -0.0471  -0.0418   -0.0371   
  (0.0461)  (0.0448)   (0.0440)   
Facility with no classification 0.0081  -0.0511   -0.0256   
  (0.3990)  (0.3875)   (0.3791)   
Average penalty 0.0627 *** 0.0642 *** 0.0612 *** 
  (0.0045)  (0.0045)   (0.0044)   
Average IEA 0.2052 *** 0.3405 *** 0.3454 *** 
  (0.0329)  (0.0339)   (0.0337)   
Average inspection -0.0034  0.0024   -0.0013   
  (0.0206)  (0.0199)   (0.0195)   
Constant -2.1208 *** -1.9805 *** -2.1119 *** 
  (0.1191)  (0.1182)   (0.1242)   
Lnsig2u -1.3489 *** -1.4448 *** -1.5080 *** 
  (0.0505)  (0.0534)   (0.0552)   
Sigma u 0.5094 *** 0.4856 *** 0.4705 *** 
  (0.0129)  (0.0130)   (0.0130)   
Rho 0.2061 *** 0.1908 *** 0.1812 *** 
  (0.0083)   (0.0082)   (0.0082)   
Seasonal dummies and time effects are omitted for brevity 
*, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively  
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Table 6: Effluent Violation Decision under DCE 
Specification 
  A B C D E 
Probability of inspection       -1.5487 ***    -1.4563 *** 
        (0.0880)      (0.0870)   
Penalty (Self) 1-4 quarters ago -0.0199 *** -0.0187 *** -0.0174 *** -0.0165 *** -0.0153 *** 
  (0.0043)   (0.0043)   (0.0043)   (0.0043)   (0.0044)   
Penalty (Self) 5-8 quarters ago -0.0102 ** -0.0084 * -0.0102 ** -0.0076 * -0.0083 * 
  (0.0044)   (0.0045)   (0.0045)   (0.0045)   (0.0045)   
Penalty (Reputation) 1-4 quarters ago    -0.0064 ** -0.0034   -0.0056 * -0.0035   
     (0.0029)   (0.0029)   (0.0030)   (0.0030)   
Penalty (Reputation) 5-8 quarters ago    -0.0172 *** -0.0112 *** -0.0169 *** -0.0120 *** 
     (0.0030)   (0.0030)   (0.0031)   (0.0031)   
IEA (Self) 1-4 quarters ago 0.0110 *** 0.0214 *** 0.0266 *** 0.0205 *** 0.0227 *** 
  (0.0041)   (0.0048)   (0.0048)   (0.0049)   (0.0049)   
IEA (Self) 5-8 quarters ago -0.0316 *** -0.0140 *** -0.0093 * -0.0146 *** -0.0130 ** 
  (0.0045)   (0.0050)   (0.0050)   (0.0051)   (0.0051)   
IEA (Reputation) 1-4 quarters ago    -0.0129 ** -0.0160 *** -0.0079   -0.0104 * 
     (0.0053)   (0.0053)   (0.0055)   (0.0055)   
IEA (Reputation) 5-8 quarters ago    -0.0436 *** -0.0347 *** -0.0474 *** -0.0388 *** 
     (0.0053)   (0.0053)   (0.0055)   (0.0056)   
Inspected and no violation detected 1-4 quarters ago 0.0825 *** 0.0952 *** 0.0932 *** 0.0990 *** 0.0895 *** 
  (0.0177)   (0.0177)   (0.0168)   (0.0177)   (0.0169)   
Inspected and no violation detected 5-8 quarters ago -0.1247 *** -0.1137 *** -0.0159   -0.1208 *** -0.0279   
  (0.0183)   (0.0182)   (0.0184)   (0.0184)   (0.0185)   
Number of effluent violation 1-4 quarters ago 0.6941 *** 0.6808 *** 0.6870 *** 0.6802 *** 0.6834 *** 
  (0.0087)   (0.0087)   (0.0087)   (0.0088)   (0.0088)   
Number of effluent violation 5-8quarters ago 0.0639 *** 0.0511 *** 0.0708 *** 0.0662 *** 0.0840 *** 
  (0.0097)   (0.0097)   (0.0097)   (0.0098)   (0.0098)   
Percent urban 0.0213   0.0207   0.0064   0.0270   0.0177   
  (0.0349)   (0.0351)   (0.0353)   (0.0353)   (0.0355)   
Percent white 0.5409 *** 0.2829 *** 0.3808 *** 0.2279 *** 0.3029 *** 
  (0.0572)   (0.0590)   (0.0585)   (0.0599)   (0.0593)   
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Specification 
  A B C D E 
Unemployment rate 0.0030   -0.0032   -0.0067 * -0.0027   -0.0005   
  (0.0035)   (0.0035)   (0.0035)   (0.0038)   (0.0038)   
Percent of owner occupant -0.4657 *** -0.1471   -0.1681   0.0014   0.0735   
  (0.0968)   (0.1003)   (0.1023)   (0.1046)   (0.1069)   
Percent of bachelor + graduate degree -0.9042 *** -1.0930 *** -1.0239 *** -0.8919 *** -0.6337 *** 
  (0.1550)   (0.1589)   (0.1594)   (0.1669)   (0.1680)   
Primary industry -0.1567 *** -0.1321 *** -0.1834 *** -0.1326 *** -0.1836 *** 
  (0.0174)   (0.0175)   (0.0176)   (0.0176)   (0.0177)   
Not primary industry -0.0466   -0.0343   -0.0813 *** -0.0339   -0.0781 ** 
  (0.0296)   (0.0297)   (0.0299)   (0.0299)   (0.0301)   
Not on ELG 0.0432   0.0469   -0.0080   0.0486   -0.0020   
  (0.0346)   (0.0348)   (0.0348)   (0.0348)   (0.0348)   
Facility with no classification 0.1067   0.0178   -0.0196   0.0881   0.0446   
  (0.3538)   (0.3545)   (0.3576)   (0.3524)   (0.3555)   
Average penalty 0.0405 *** 0.0460 *** 0.0507 *** 0.0441 *** 0.0487 *** 
  (0.0034)   (0.0035)   (0.0035)   (0.0035)   (0.0035)   
Average IEA 0.2049 *** 0.3739 *** 0.3390 *** 0.3710 *** 0.3595 *** 
  (0.0273)   (0.0298)   (0.0299)   (0.0306)   (0.0307)   
Average inspection -0.4092 *** -0.3995 *** 0.0642 ** -0.3972 *** 0.0453   
  (0.0307)   (0.0295)   (0.0273)   (0.0295)   (0.0280)   
Constant -1.2797 *** -1.1069 *** -0.9642 *** -0.9780 *** -0.9681 *** 
  (0.0899)   (0.0922)   (0.0934)   (0.1006)   (0.1014)   
Seasonal dummies and time effects are omitted for brevity 
*, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively 
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Table 7: Inspection Decision under DCE 
Specification 
  A B C D E 
Probability of violation        12.5781 ***    12.4828 *** 
         (0.3531)      (0.3463)   
Probability of self report        -16.3901 ***    -16.2070 *** 
         (0.4243)      (0.4158)   
Penalty (Self) 1-4 quarters ago 0.0039 * 0.0039 * 0.0066 *** 0.0041 * 0.0066 *** 
  (0.0022)   (0.0022)   (0.0024)   (0.0022)   (0.0024)   
Penalty (Self) 5-8 quarters ago -0.0027   -0.0027   -0.0053 ** -0.0008   -0.0037   
  (0.0022)   (0.0022)   (0.0023)   (0.0022)   (0.0024)   
Number of IEA 1-4 quarters ago 0.0081 *** 0.0081 *** 0.0039   0.0031   -0.0004   
  (0.0023)   (0.0023)   (0.0025)   (0.0023)   (0.0025)   
Number of IEA 5-8 quarters ago 0.0105 *** 0.0105 *** 0.0134 *** 0.0053 ** 0.0099 *** 
  (0.0023)   (0.0023)   (0.0025)   (0.0023)   (0.0025)   
Inspected 1-4 quarters ago 0.1421 *** 0.1421 *** 0.1021 *** 0.1268 *** 0.0932 *** 
  (0.0077)   (0.0077)   (0.0077)   (0.0077)   (0.0078)   
Inspected 5-8 quarters ago 0.3908 *** 0.3908 *** 0.2968 *** 0.3936 *** 0.3033 *** 
  (0.0080)   (0.0080)   (0.0083)   (0.0081)   (0.0083)   
Number of effluent violation 1-4 quarters ago 0.0012   0.0012   -0.2783 *** -0.0015   -0.2858 *** 
  (0.0049)   (0.0049)   (0.0200)   (0.0049)   (0.0196)   
Number of effluent violation 5-8quarters ago -0.0021   -0.0021   -0.0009   -0.0034   -0.0086   
  (0.0050)   (0.0050)   (0.0058)   (0.0051)   (0.0059)   
Number of reporting violation 1-4 quarters ago -0.0610 *** -0.0610 *** -0.0563 *** -0.0670 *** -0.0605 *** 
  (0.0069)   (0.0069)   (0.0069)   (0.0069)   (0.0070)   
Number of reporting violation 5-8 quarters ago -0.0445 *** -0.0445 *** -0.0327 *** -0.0471 *** -0.0386 *** 
  (0.0071)   (0.0071)   (0.0071)   (0.0072)   (0.0072)   
Budget per Facility -0.0646 *** -0.0646 *** -0.0323 *** -0.0697 *** -0.0403 *** 
  (0.0054)   (0.0054)   (0.0055)   (0.0055)   (0.0056)   
Number of facility in the same 2-digit SIC 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 ** 0.0001 *** 0.0000   
  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   
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Specification 
  A B C D E 
Percent urban 0.1093 *** 0.1093 *** 0.0793 *** 0.1243 *** 0.0907 *** 
  (0.0161)   (0.0161)   (0.0161)   (0.0161)   (0.0162)   
Percent white 0.2101 *** 0.2101 *** 0.0321   0.1834 *** 0.0392   
  (0.0255)   (0.0255)   (0.0262)   (0.0260)   (0.0266)   
Unemployment rate -0.0109 *** -0.0109 *** -0.0054 *** 0.0011   0.0037 ** 
  (0.0017)   (0.0017)   (0.0017)   (0.0018)   (0.0018)   
Percent of owner occupant 0.3367 *** 0.3367 *** 0.4113 *** 0.5207 *** 0.4921 *** 
  (0.0468)   (0.0468)   (0.0468)   (0.0487)   (0.0487)   
Percent of bachelor + graduate degree 0.0170   0.0170   0.2411 *** 0.4137 *** 0.4659 *** 
  (0.0689)   (0.0689)   (0.0700)   (0.0726)   (0.0733)   
Primary industry -0.2056 *** -0.2056 *** -0.1580 *** -0.2166 *** -0.1668 *** 
  (0.0080)   (0.0080)   (0.0082)   (0.0080)   (0.0083)   
Not primary industry -0.1604 *** -0.1604 *** -0.1103 *** -0.1655 *** -0.1152 *** 
  (0.0141)   (0.0141)   (0.0142)   (0.0142)   (0.0143)   
Not on ELG -0.2177 *** -0.2177 *** -0.1915 *** -0.2194 *** -0.1941 *** 
  (0.0162)   (0.0162)   (0.0163)   (0.0163)   (0.0164)   
Facility with no classification -0.2503   -0.2503   -0.5506 *** -0.2492   -0.5522 *** 
  (0.1529)   (0.1529)   (0.1547)   (0.1523)   (0.1554)   
Average penalty 0.0200 *** 0.0200 *** -0.0026   0.0199 *** -0.0022   
  (0.0018)   (0.0018)   (0.0020)   (0.0018)   (0.0020)   
Average IEA 0.0661 *** 0.0661 *** 0.0234   0.1097 *** 0.0592 *** 
  (0.0152)   (0.0152)   (0.0167)   (0.0155)   (0.0170)   
Constant -0.8313 *** -0.8313 *** -0.9353 *** -1.0467 *** -1.1199 *** 
  (0.0584)   (0.0584)   (0.0589)   (0.0614)   (0.0620)   
Seasonal dummies and time effects are omitted for brevity 
*, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively 
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Table 8: Self Report Decision under DCE 
Specification 
  A B C D E 
Probability of inspection       -0.1413 **    -0.1488 *** 
        (0.0560)      (0.0555)   
Number of reporting violation 1-4 quarters ago 0.0237 * 0.0177   0.0157   0.0097   0.0074   
  (0.0123)  (0.0124)   (0.0124)   (0.0124)   (0.0124)   
Number of reporting violation 5-8 quarters ago 0.0155  0.0091   0.0072   0.0213 * 0.0194   
  (0.0123)  (0.0124)   (0.0125)   (0.0125)   (0.0125)   
Inspected and violation detected 1-4 quarters ago 1.2321 *** 1.2076 *** 1.2125 *** 1.2063 *** 1.2110 *** 
  (0.0172)  (0.0173)   (0.0174)   (0.0174)   (0.0175)   
Inspected and violation detected 5-8 quarters ago 0.5487 *** 0.5216 *** 0.5287 *** 0.5421 *** 0.5496 *** 
  (0.0204)  (0.0207)   (0.0209)   (0.0208)   (0.0211)   
Penalty (Self) 1-4 quarters ago 0.0086 ** 0.0126 *** 0.0131 *** 0.0143 *** 0.0148 *** 
  (0.0038)  (0.0039)   (0.0039)   (0.0039)   (0.0039)   
Penalty (Self) 5-8 quarters ago -0.0069 * -0.0015   -0.0012   0.0006   0.0010   
  (0.0041)  (0.0042)   (0.0043)   (0.0042)   (0.0043)   
Penalty (Reputation) 1-4 quarters ago   -0.0053 ** -0.0050 ** -0.0074 *** -0.0071 *** 
    (0.0025)   (0.0025)   (0.0026)   (0.0026)   
Penalty (Reputation) 5-8 quarters ago   -0.0145 *** -0.0139 *** -0.0142 *** -0.0137 *** 
    (0.0026)   (0.0026)   (0.0026)   (0.0026)   
Number of IEA 1-4 quarters ago 0.0605 *** 0.0868 *** 0.0869 *** 0.0846 *** 0.0846 *** 
  (0.0037)  (0.0044)   (0.0044)   (0.0044)   (0.0044)   
Number of IEA 5-8 quarters ago -0.0121 *** 0.0112 ** 0.0112 ** 0.0094 ** 0.0092 ** 
  (0.0040)  (0.0045)   (0.0045)   (0.0045)   (0.0045)   
IEA (Reputation) 1-4 quarters ago   -0.0270 *** -0.0269 *** -0.0250 *** -0.0248 *** 
    (0.0069)   (0.0069)   (0.0069)   (0.0069)   
IEA (Reputation) 5-8 quarters ago   -0.0306 *** -0.0299 *** -0.0297 *** -0.0289 *** 
    (0.0064)   (0.0064)   (0.0064)   (0.0064)   
Number of facility in the same 2-digit SIC -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0004 *** 
  (0.0001)  (0.0001)   (0.0001)   (0.0001)   (0.0001)   
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Specification 
  A B C D E 
Primary industry -0.2588 *** -0.2349 *** -0.2454 *** -0.2351 *** -0.2461 *** 
  (0.0157)  (0.0158)   (0.0164)   (0.0158)   (0.0164)   
Not primary industry -0.1339 *** -0.1208 *** -0.1305 *** -0.1170 *** -0.1271 *** 
  (0.0267)  (0.0269)   (0.0272)   (0.0270)   (0.0273)   
Not on ELG -0.1207 *** -0.1170 *** -0.1268 *** -0.1106 *** -0.1205 *** 
  (0.0289)  (0.0292)   (0.0296)   (0.0293)   (0.0296)   
Facility with no classification -0.7975 * -0.8966 * -0.9085 ** -0.9147 ** -0.9278 ** 
  (0.4614)  (0.4604)   (0.4612)   (0.4565)   (0.4575)   
Constant -1.7767 *** -1.6494 *** -1.6104 *** -1.5283 *** -1.4865 *** 
  (0.0166)   (0.0184)   (0.0241)   (0.0368)   (0.0400)   
Seasonal dummies and time effects are omitted for brevity 
*, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively  
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Table 9: Change of Predicted Probability of Violation under Probit 
Specification 
  A B C D E 
Probability of inspection (1)        -0.08%      -0.02%   
Penalty (Self) 1-4 quarters ago (2) -1.26% *** -1.14% *** -1.14% *** -1.00% *** -1.00% *** 
Penalty (Self) 5-8 quarters ago (2) -0.91% *** -0.78% *** -0.79% *** -0.64% *** -0.64% *** 
Penalty (Reputation) 1-4 quarters ago (3)    0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   
Penalty (Reputation) 5-8 quarters ago (3)    -0.01% *** -0.01% *** -0.01% *** -0.01% *** 
IEA (Self) 1-4 quarters ago (4) 0.09% *** 0.14% *** 0.14% *** 0.12% *** 0.12% *** 
IEA (Self) 5-8 quarters ago (4) -0.21% *** -0.12% *** -0.12% *** -0.13% *** -0.14% *** 
IEA (Reputation) 1-4 quarters ago (4)    0.00% ** 0.00% ** 0.00%   0.00%   
IEA (Reputation) 5-8 quarters ago (4)    0.00% *** 0.00% *** 0.00% *** 0.00% *** 
Inspected and no violation detected 1-4 quarters ago (5) 0.51% *** 0.54% *** 0.54% *** 0.51% *** 0.51% *** 
Inspected and no violation detected 5-8 quarters ago (5) 0.11%  0.16%   0.18% * 0.11%   0.12%   
Number of effluent violation 1-4 quarters ago (1) 5.36% *** 4.97% *** 4.98% *** 5.84% *** 4.88% *** 
Number of effluent violation 5-8quarters ago (1) 0.42% *** 0.35% *** 0.35% *** 0.54% *** 0.41% *** 
Percent urban (1) -0.03%  -0.03%   -0.03%   -0.01%   -0.01%   
Percent white (1) 0.65% *** 0.38% *** 0.39% *** 0.28% *** 0.29% *** 
Unemployment rate (1) -0.08% * -0.14% *** -0.15% *** -0.05%   -0.05%   
Percent of owner occupant (1) -0.25% *** -0.11% ** -0.10% * 0.04%   0.05%   
Percent of bachelor + graduate degree (1) -0.36% *** -0.38% *** -0.38% *** -0.22% *** -0.22% *** 
Primary industry (5) -1.37% *** -1.18% *** -1.20% *** -1.18% *** -1.19% *** 
Not primary industry (5) -0.71% *** -0.61% *** -0.63% *** -0.57% *** -0.58% *** 
Not on ELG (5) -0.14%  -0.13%   -0.17%   -0.11%   -0.14%   
*, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively 
(1) The change of predicted probability is based on one standard deviation increase 
(2) The change of predicted probability is based on changing penalty from $0 to $19,799 (mean of non-zero penalty 1-4 quarters) 
(3) The change of predicted probability is based increased of reputation penalty by $139 
(4) The change of predicted probability is based on one additional IEA 
(5) The change of predicted probability is based on a change of dummy variable from zero to one 
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Table 10: Change of Predicted Probability of Violation under DCE 
Specification 
  A B C D E 
Probability of inspection (1)       -4.50% ***    -4.36% *** 
Penalty (Self) 1-4 quarters ago (2) -3.54% *** -3.11% *** -3.02% *** -2.86% *** -2.75% *** 
Penalty (Self) 5-8 quarters ago (2) -1.93% ** -1.49% * -1.86% ** -1.40% * -1.56% * 
Penalty (Reputation) 1-4 quarters ago (3)    -0.01% ** -0.01%   -0.01% * -0.01%   
Penalty (Reputation) 5-8 quarters ago (3)    -0.04% *** -0.02% *** -0.04% *** -0.03% *** 
IEA (Self) 1-4 quarters ago (4) 0.23% *** 0.41% *** 0.53% *** 0.40% *** 0.46% *** 
IEA (Self) 5-8 quarters ago (4) -0.63% *** -0.26% *** -0.18% * -0.28% *** -0.26% ** 
IEA (Reputation) 1-4 quarters ago (4)    0.00% ** 0.00% *** 0.00%   0.00% * 
IEA (Reputation) 5-8 quarters ago (4)    0.00% *** 0.00% *** -0.01% *** 0.00% *** 
Inspected and no violation detected 1-4 quarters ago (5) 1.63% *** 1.75% *** 1.77% *** 1.86% *** 1.74% *** 
Inspected and no violation detected 5-8 quarters ago (5) -2.62% *** -2.23% *** -0.31%   -2.43% *** -0.56%   
Number of effluent violation 1-4 quarters ago (1) 15.76% *** 14.54% *** 15.12% *** 14.82% *** 15.26% *** 
Number of effluent violation 5-8quarters ago (1) 1.19% *** 0.88% *** 1.27% *** 1.17% *** 1.54% *** 
Percent urban (1) 0.11%   0.10%   0.03%   0.14%   0.09%   
Percent white (1) 1.76% *** 0.84% *** 1.18% *** 0.69% *** 0.95% *** 
Unemployment rate (1) 0.13%   -0.13%   -0.28% * -0.11%   -0.02%   
Percent of owner occupant (1) -0.78% *** -0.23%   -0.28%   0.00%   0.12%   
Percent of bachelor + graduate degree (1) -1.01% *** -1.12% *** -1.09% *** -0.95% *** -0.70% *** 
Primary industry (5) -3.04% *** -2.40% *** -3.40% *** -2.47% *** -3.47% *** 
Not primary industry (5) -0.92%   -0.64%   -1.52% *** -0.65%   -1.49% ** 
Not on ELG (5) 0.90%   0.91%   -0.16%   0.97%   -0.04%   
*, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively 
(1). The change of predicted probability is based on one standard deviation increase 
(2). The change of predicted probability is based on changing penalty from $0 to $19,799 (mean of non-zero penalty 1-4 quarters) 
(3). The change of predicted probability is based increased of reputation penalty by $139 
(4). The change of predicted probability is based on one additional IEA 
(5). The change of predicted probability is based on a change of dummy variable from zero to one 
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Table 11: Effluent Violation Decision under DCE (Non-municipal Facilities) 
  Specification 
  A B C D E 
Probability of inspection        -1.4535 ***    -1.3592 *** 
         (0.2333)      (0.2333)   
Penalty (Self) 1-4 quarters ago -0.0191 ** -0.0177 ** -0.0159 * -0.0159 * -0.0143 * 
  (0.0085)   (0.0085)   (0.0086)   (0.0086)   (0.0086)   
Penalty (Self) 5-8 quarters ago -0.0118   -0.0079   -0.0076   -0.0066   -0.0063   
  (0.0085)   (0.0086)   (0.0086)   (0.0086)   (0.0086)   
Penalty (Reputation) 1-4 quarters ago     -0.0072   -0.0046   -0.0083   -0.0064   
      (0.0056)   (0.0056)   (0.0058)   (0.0058)   
Penalty (Reputation) 5-8 quarters ago     -0.0171 *** -0.0119 ** -0.0167 *** -0.0122 ** 
      (0.0057)   (0.0057)   (0.0059)   (0.0059)   
IEA (Self) 1-4 quarters ago 0.0180 ** 0.0276 *** 0.0308 *** 0.0280 *** 0.0282 *** 
  (0.0081)   (0.0093)   (0.0093)   (0.0094)   (0.0094)   
IEA (Self) 5-8 quarters ago -0.0136   0.0058   0.0051   0.0067   0.0034   
  (0.0093)   (0.0103)   (0.0104)   (0.0104)   (0.0105)   
IEA (Reputation) 1-4 quarters ago     -0.0182 * -0.0167 * -0.0135   -0.0117   
      (0.0093)   (0.0094)   (0.0097)   (0.0098)   
IEA (Reputation) 5-8 quarters ago     -0.0383 *** -0.0363 *** -0.0412 *** -0.0388 *** 
      (0.0091)   (0.0092)   (0.0099)   (0.0100)   
Inspected and no violation detected 1-4 quarters ago 0.1231 *** 0.1386 *** 0.0906 *** 0.1414 *** 0.0896 *** 
  (0.0316)   (0.0315)   (0.0308)   (0.0316)   (0.0314)   
Inspected and no violation detected 5-8 quarters ago -0.0908 *** -0.0738 ** -0.0275   -0.0771 ** -0.0359   
  (0.0320)   (0.0319)   (0.0320)   (0.0322)   (0.0320)   
Number of effluent violation 1-4 quarters ago 0.7503 *** 0.7355 *** 0.7426 *** 0.7346 *** 0.7387 *** 
  (0.0183)   (0.0184)   (0.0185)   (0.0185)   (0.0186)   
Number of effluent violation 5-8quarters ago 0.0722 *** 0.0587 *** 0.0751 *** 0.0730 *** 0.0882 *** 
  (0.0208)   (0.0208)   (0.0212)   (0.0211)   (0.0214)   
Percent urban 0.1859 *** 0.1977 *** 0.1496 ** 0.2103 *** 0.1713 ** 
  (0.0657)   (0.0667)   (0.0674)   (0.0673)   (0.0678)   
Percent white 1.0194 *** 0.7106 *** 0.7393 *** 0.6821 *** 0.6924 *** 
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  Specification 
  A B C D E 
  (0.1077)   (0.1103)   (0.1099)   (0.1120)   (0.1111)   
Unemployment rate 0.0207 *** 0.0147 ** 0.0068   0.0159 ** 0.0130 * 
  (0.0066)   (0.0067)   (0.0068)   (0.0070)   (0.0070)   
Percent of owner occupant -0.4376 ** -0.0733   -0.1854   0.0712   0.0528   
  (0.1878)   (0.1963)   (0.1991)   (0.2063)   (0.2081)   
Percent of bachelor + graduate degree -0.4105   -0.7275 ** -0.8428 ** -0.5029   -0.4276   
  (0.3260)   (0.3376)   (0.3377)   (0.3551)   (0.3559)   
Primary industry -0.2847   -0.1837   -0.1704   -0.2624   -0.2464   
  (0.3618)   (0.3620)   (0.3672)   (0.3596)   (0.3650)   
Not primary industry -0.1654   -0.0737   -0.0620   -0.1523   -0.1354   
  (0.3625)   (0.3628)   (0.3679)   (0.3603)   (0.3657)   
Not on ELG -0.0940   -0.0113   -0.0040   -0.0868   -0.0730   
  (0.3632)   (0.3635)   (0.3686)   (0.3610)   (0.3664)   
Average penalty 0.0440 *** 0.0474 *** 0.0467 *** 0.0463 *** 0.0458 *** 
  (0.0065)   (0.0067)   (0.0066)   (0.0067)   (0.0066)   
Average IEA 0.1966 *** 0.4013 *** 0.4119 *** 0.3833 *** 0.4099 *** 
  (0.0585)   (0.0625)   (0.0624)   (0.0645)   (0.0647)   
Average inspection -0.5979 *** -0.5931 *** 0.0167   -0.5988 *** -0.0167   
  (0.0797)   (0.0764)   (0.0940)   (0.0764)   (0.0984)   
Constant -1.8306 *** -1.7226 *** -1.4523 *** -1.6452 *** -1.4996 *** 
  (0.4017)   (0.4019)   (0.4095)   (0.4058)   (0.4118)   
Seasonal dummies and time effects are omitted for brevity 
*, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively  
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Table 12: Effluent Violation Decision under DCE (SIC 49) 
Specification 
  A B C D E 
Probability of inspection       -1.5580 ***    -1.4690 *** 
        (0.0947)      (0.0933)   
Penalty (Self) 1-4 quarters ago -0.0213 *** -0.0204 *** -0.0198 *** -0.0183 *** -0.0177 *** 
  (0.0049)  (0.0049)   (0.0050)   (0.0050)   (0.0050)   
Penalty (Self) 5-8 quarters ago -0.0116 ** -0.0107 ** -0.0138 *** -0.0100 * -0.0115 ** 
  (0.0051)  (0.0052)   (0.0052)   (0.0053)   (0.0053)   
Penalty (Reputation) 1-4 quarters ago   -0.0050   -0.0026   -0.0041   -0.0024   
    (0.0033)   (0.0033)   (0.0034)   (0.0034)   
Penalty (Reputation) 5-8 quarters ago   -0.0174 *** -0.0107 *** -0.0169 *** -0.0115 *** 
    (0.0034)   (0.0034)   (0.0035)   (0.0035)   
IEA (Self) 1-4 quarters ago 0.0089 * 0.0199 *** 0.0254 *** 0.0187 *** 0.0213 *** 
  (0.0046)  (0.0054)   (0.0055)   (0.0056)   (0.0056)   
IEA (Self) 5-8 quarters ago -0.0366 *** -0.0186 *** -0.0129 ** -0.0198 *** -0.0171 *** 
  (0.0050)  (0.0056)   (0.0057)   (0.0058)   (0.0058)   
IEA (Reputation) 1-4 quarters ago   -0.0117 * -0.0174 *** -0.0066   -0.0114 * 
    (0.0063)   (0.0063)   (0.0065)   (0.0065)   
IEA (Reputation) 5-8 quarters ago   -0.0473 *** -0.0347 *** -0.0511 *** -0.0393 *** 
    (0.0062)   (0.0063)   (0.0065)   (0.0066)   
Inspected and no violation detected 1-4 quarters ago 0.0796 *** 0.0910 *** 0.1015 *** 0.0949 *** 0.0974 *** 
  (0.0205)  (0.0203)   (0.0194)   (0.0204)   (0.0195)   
Inspected and no violation detected 5-8 quarters ago -0.1356 *** -0.1271 *** -0.0140   -0.1348 *** -0.0264   
  (0.0212)  (0.0211)   (0.0215)   (0.0212)   (0.0216)   
Number of effluent violation 1-4 quarters ago 0.6876 *** 0.6743 *** 0.6803 *** 0.6742 *** 0.6775 *** 
  (0.0097)  (0.0097)   (0.0097)   (0.0098)   (0.0097)   
Number of effluent violation 5-8quarters ago 0.0643 *** 0.0513 *** 0.0716 *** 0.0668 *** 0.0848 *** 
  (0.0107)  (0.0107)   (0.0107)   (0.0109)   (0.0108)   
Percent urban -0.0504  -0.0552   -0.0557   -0.0503   -0.0480   
  (0.0397)  (0.0398)   (0.0400)   (0.0400)   (0.0402)   
Percent white 0.3649 *** 0.1271 * 0.2399 *** 0.0621   0.1528 ** 
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Specification 
  A B C D E 
  (0.0653)  (0.0675)   (0.0668)   (0.0685)   (0.0679)   
Unemployment rate 0.0015  -0.0050   -0.0062   -0.0049   -0.0003   
  (0.0040)  (0.0040)   (0.0040)   (0.0043)   (0.0043)   
Percent of owner occupant -0.3914 *** -0.0904   -0.1119   0.0668   0.1336   
  (0.1074)  (0.1112)   (0.1137)   (0.1162)   (0.1191)   
Percent of bachelor + graduate degree -0.9400 *** -1.0938 *** -0.9887 *** -0.8988 *** -0.6133 *** 
  (0.1705)  (0.1744)   (0.1751)   (0.1829)   (0.1843)   
Primary industry -0.3110 *** -0.2806 *** -0.3328 *** -0.2786 *** -0.3303 *** 
  (0.0301)  (0.0302)   (0.0306)   (0.0305)   (0.0309)   
Not on ELG 0.1727 *** 0.1776 *** 0.1122 ** 0.1669 *** 0.1042 ** 
  (0.0516)  (0.0517)   (0.0517)   (0.0518)   (0.0518)   
Average penalty 0.0380 *** 0.0440 *** 0.0514 *** 0.0418 *** 0.0492 *** 
  (0.0040)  (0.0040)   (0.0041)   (0.0040)   (0.0041)   
Average IEA 0.2036 *** 0.3711 *** 0.3199 *** 0.3705 *** 0.3444 *** 
  (0.0301)  (0.0331)   (0.0332)   (0.0339)   (0.0340)   
Average inspection -0.3831 *** -0.3714 *** 0.0745 *** -0.3681 *** 0.0581 ** 
  (0.0317)  (0.0304)   (0.0282)   (0.0303)   (0.0288)   
Constant -1.1266 *** -0.9600 *** -0.8676 *** -0.8142 *** -1.4629 *** 
  (0.0997)   (0.1021)   (0.1031)   (0.1117)   (0.0453)   
Seasonal dummies and time effects are omitted for brevity 
*, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively  
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Table 13: Descriptive Statistics of Undetected Violation Estimates 
 
  Effluent Violation 
  Observation Mean Std Deviation 
Specification C       
All facilities                 131,140  13.74% 12.59% 
Municipal facilities                   78,815  15.06% 13.63% 
Primary industries on ELG                   37,835  10.70% 9.55% 
SIC 49                   93,906  14.35% 13.10% 
Specification E       
All facilities                 131,140  15.04% 14.86% 
Municipal facilities                   78,815  16.50% 15.98% 
Primary industries on ELG                   37,835  11.79% 11.79% 
SIC 49                   93,906  15.74% 15.44% 
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CHAPTER IV 
ESSAY TWO: TARGETING ENFORCEMENT UNDER  
IMPERFECT DETECTION 
 
Introduction 
 In the regulatory enforcement literature, Harrington’s (1988) work has been 
frequently cited in empirical and theoretical studies to explain firms’ compliance 
decisions in a regime where the probability of inspection is low and penalties are 
restricted. While experimental studies confirm Harrington’s predictions, many 
nonexperimental (econometric) studies only partially support Harrington’s predictions. 
Through an extension of the Harrington model, we identify a possible explanation for the 
discrepancy between Harrington’s theoretical predictions and the nonexperimental 
empirical evidence. 
Harrington (1988) proposed a dynamic repeated game model to reconcile the low 
expected penalties for noncompliance with pollution regulation laws and the high 
observed compliance rates among regulated firms. In his model, the regulator alters the 
expected penalty and the inspection probability based on the firm’s past performance. 
The regulator places the firm in one of two groups, the target group or the non-target 
group, based on the firm’s past performance.   
We extend the Harrington model in two ways. First, given that a violation 
happens, the probability of detecting a violation during an inspection can be less than
one. In other words, undetected violations are possible. Harrington’s model assumes that 
whenever a violator is inspected, the regulator detects the violation with probability equal 
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to one. Second, similar to Friesen (2003), movement between groups can arise from three 
outcomes: (1) no inspection, (2) inspection that detects no violation,29 and (3) inspection 
that discovers a violation.  
 We find that imperfect detection changes the threshold points where firms change 
their strategy. Assuming that the firms are uniformly distributed, imperfect detection in 
the non target group reduces the number of firms that always comply, increases the 
number of firms that adopt an alternating strategy (i.e., comply in non target group, but 
violate when in the target group), and surprisingly, reduces the number of firms that 
always violate. On the other hand, imperfect detection in the target group increases the 
number of firm that always violate. The increase in the number of firm that always 
violate (due to imperfect detection in the target group) is greater than the decrease caused 
by imperfect detection in the non target group. Thus, given the same detection rate in 
both groups, the number of firms that always violate will increase. Furthermore, these 
results have implications for the way in which Harrington’s model is tested empirically 
and suggests an explanation for the discrepancy in results among experimental and 
nonexperimental tests of the Harrington model.  
 
The model 
 The model consists of two separate decisions made by two agents. The regulator 
makes an inspection decision, while the firm makes a compliance decision. On the 
regulator side, limited enforcement resources cause the regulator to adopt targeting 
strategy.   The regulator classifies firms into two groups: the non target group ( )1G  and 
                                                 
29 Friesen (2003) assumes complete detection (implicitly). This assumption implies that whenever no 
violation was found during an inspection, the facility was truly in compliance. Assuming imperfect 
detection implies that no violation may be uncovered even if the firm were to be out of compliance. 
58 
 
 
the target group ( )2G . The target group faces more stringent enforcement than the non 
target group. The probability of any firm in 1G  and 2G  being inspected are 1p  and 2p  
respectively. Firms in 2G  has a greater probability of being inspected ( )12 pp > . If the 
regulator detects a violation during an inspection, a penalty of 1F  will be given if the 
violator is in 1G , and by the amount of 2F  if the violator is in 2G . By construction, 
penalty in the target group is larger than the non target group ( )12 FF > .  
 On the firm side, we assume that the firm has already installed the capital 
equipment to meet the environmental regulation (in other words, firm is already in “initial 
compliance”).30 However, to keep the firm in “continuing compliance”, it must spend a 
cost of $c per period. This cost can be avoided if the firm decides to violate, but at the 
expense of an increase in the expected cost of non compliance. The objective of a firm is 
to find a policy – i.e., a compliance choice in each group – that minimizes its expected 
cost. 
 There are two innovations that we add to the Harrington model. First, we 
introduce two additional parameters— 1d  and 2d --which reflect the probability of 
detecting a violation in 1G  and 2G  conditional that a violation exists and inspection is 
performed. This is to accommodate the possibilities that not every violation is detected 
even if inspection is performed.31 Second, we relax Harrington’s assumption on the 
movement between groups. Movement between groups is possible even without the 
                                                 
30 “Initial compliance” is the term used by Livernois and McKenna (1999), and later adapted by Friesen 
(2003) to refer that firm has already installed the pollution abatement device.  
 
31 To avoid the compliant firm being fined, we exclude the possibility of wrongful conviction 
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presence of inspection or detection of violation.32 The regulator can condition the 
transition probabilities between groups. The transition parameters are given in Table 14. 
The advantage of using this framework is that it allows us to make different assumptions 
about the movement between groups, yet it remains general enough to cover Harrington’s 
original framework (by setting ,01 =a ,01 =b ,11 =u ,02 =a 02 =u ).  
 
Table 14: Transition parameters 
Probability of being moved to Initial Group Observation 
1G  2G  
No inspection 
11 a−  1a  
No violation was detected  
11 b−  1b  
 
1G  
Violation was detected  
11 u−  1u  
No inspection 
2a  21 a−  
No violation was detected  
2b  21 b−  
 
2G  
Violation was detected  
2u  21 u−  
 
 Our extension to Harrington model changes the probabilities of movement 
between groups. The transition probabilities are depicted in Table 15. Let Vijt denotes the 
transition probability of movement from group i to group j when firm decides to violate, 
and Cijt  denotes the transition probability of movement from group i to group j when firm 
decides to comply. Having defined Vijt and 
C
ijt , Table 15 is simplified into Table 16, which 
will be useful to summarize the calculation of expected cost.  
                                                 
32 Friesen (2003) shows that random movement to the target group leads to a reduced inspection cost 
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Table 15: Transition Probabilities 
 
Violate  Comply 
Undetected Detected 
Initial 
group  
1G  2G  1G  2G  1G  2G  
 
1G  
( )( )
( )11
11
1
11
bp
ap
−+
−−
 
( )
11
111
bp
ap
+
−
 
( )( )
( )( )111
11
11
11
bdp
ap
−−
+−−
 
( )
( ) 111
11
1
1
bdp
ap
−
+−
 
( )111 1 udp −  111 udp  
 
2G  
( )
22
221
bp
ap
+
−
 
( )( )
( )22
22
1
11
bp
ap
−+
−−
 
( ) ( ) 22222 11 bdpap −+−  ( )( )
( )( )222
22
11
11
bdp
ap
−−
+−−
 222
udp  ( )222 1 udp −  
 
Table 16: Simplified Transition Probabilities 
 Comply Violate 
Initial 
group  
1G  2G  1G  2G  
 
1G  
( )( )
( )11
1111
1
11
bp
apt C
−+
−−=
 
( ) 111112 1 bpapt
C +−=  ( )( )
( )( ) ( )111111
1111
111
11
udpbdp
aptV
−+−−
+−−=
 
( )
( ) 111111
1112
1
1
udpbdp
aptV
+−
+−=
 
 
2G  
( ) 222221 1 bpapt
C +−=  ( )( )
( )22
2222
1
11
bp
aptC
−+
−−=
 
( )
( ) 222222
2221
1
1
udpbdp
aptV
+−
+−=
 
( )( )
( )( ) ( )222222
2222
111
11
udpbdp
aptV
−+−−
+−−=
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 To calculate the expected cost of each strategy, we also need the payoff matrix for 
each decision. A firm’s payoff matrix for every alternative decision is presented in Table 
17. When a firm decides to comply, the compliance cost would be c  regardless the 
presence of inspection. Monetary penalty of 1F  (or 2F ) is only imposed if a violation was 
detected.  
 
Table 17: Payoff Matrix 
1G  2G   
Comply Violate Comply Violate 
      No Inspection C 0 C 0 
No Detection C 0 C 0  
Inspection  Detection  
1F   2F  
 
 Having the information on the transition probabilities and payoff matrix, we can 
now calculate the expected cost of each decision in each group. The expected cost of 
decision i is simply the weighted average of the present value of expected costs in 1G  and 
2G . Let 1E  and 2E  denote the expected cost in 1G  and 2G  respectively, and β  denotes 
the discount factor. The expected costs of each decision in each group are described in 
equation (1) to (4).   
Expected Cost of Complying: 
When initially at group 1: ( )2121111 EtEtcE CC ++= β     (1) 
When initially in group 2: ( )2222212 EtEtcE CC ++= β     (2) 
Expected Cost of Violating: 
When initially in group 1: ( )2121111111 EtEtFdpE VV ++= β    (3) 
When initially in group 2: ( )2221212222 EtEtFdpE VV ++= β    (4) 
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 Take equation (3) for instance. The expected cost of violating when a firm is 
initially in 2G  is equal to the expected fine ( )111 Fdp  plus the present value of the 
expected cost of being moved to 1G  ( )121EtVβ  and the present value of the expected cost 
of staying in 2G , ( )222EtVβ . 
 Equations (1) to (4) are put in Table 18 to generate simultaneous equations for a 
particular strategy. Let ijf  denotes the strategy that a firm choose decision i if in 1G  and 
choose decision j if in 2G . Strategy 
00f  reflects that a firm decides to comply in 1G  and 
2G , while strategy 
10f  reflects that a firm decides to violate in 1G , but comply whenever 
in 2G . As in Harrington (1988), the expected cost of strategy
ijf  is found by solving the 
simultaneous equations of decision i  in the first column and decision j  in the second 
column. For instance, the expected cost of strategy 00f  is the solution for simultaneous 
equations (1) and (2).  
 
Table 18: Matrix of expected cost 
 
 
1G  2G  
 
Comply (0) 
 
 
( )2121111 EtEtcE CC ++= β   
 
( )2221212 EtEtcE CC ++= β  
 
Violate (1) 
 
 
( )2121111111 EtEtFdpE VV ++= β  
 
( )2221212222 EtEtFdpE VV ++= β  
 
Solving for 1E  and 2E  from four possible simultaneous equations provide us with the 
expected cost of every strategy as presented in Table 19. The value in column ijE1  reflects 
the expected cost of each strategy when a firm is initially in group 1. If a firm is initially 
in group 2, the expected costs are as described in column ijE2 .  
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Table 19: Expected Costs of Alternative Strategies 
 ijE1  
ijE2  
00f  
( )β−1
c
 
 
( )β−1
c
 
01f  ( )( )
( )( )( )VCVCV
VC
ttttt
cttFdpc
2211211222
2212222
11 βββ
β
−++−
−+
 
 
( )( )
( )( )( )VCVCV
CV
ttttt
tFdpctFdp
2211211222
1122221222
11 βββ
β
−++−
−+
 
10f  ( )( )
( )( )( )VCVCV
CV
ttttt
tFdpctFdp
1122122111
2211112111
11 βββ
β
−++−
−+
 
 
( )( )
( )( )( )VCVCV
VC
ttttt
cttFdpc
1122122111
1121111
11 βββ
β
−++−
−+
 
11f  ( )( )
( )( )( )VVVVV
VV
ttttt
tFdptFdpFdp
2211211222
2211112222111
11 βββ
β
−++−
−+
 
 
( )( )
( )( )( )VVVVV
VV
ttttt
tFdptFdpFdp
2211211222
1122221111222
11 βββ
β
−++−
−+
 
 
The optimal strategy chosen by a firm is the one that minimizes the expected cost in 
group m  
 ijm
ji
m Eg ,
min=  
 The optimal strategy when firm is initially in 1G  is shown by the bold line in 
figure 1. As can be seen, the optimal strategy depends on the compliance cost c . Firms 
with very low compliance cost will choose 00f  (always comply), firms with very large 
compliance cost will choose 11f  (always violate), and firms with medium compliance 
choose 10f  (violate whenever in non target group, but comply whenever in the target 
group).  
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Figure 1: Optimal strategy when firm initially in 1G  
 
Setting expected cost of 001E equals to
10
1E  provides us with the threshold point 1Q , where 
a firm is indifferent between 00f and 10f  . The other threshold point 2Q , where a firm is 
indifferent between 10f and 11f ,  is found by setting 101E equals to
11
1E . The strategy that a 
firm chooses depends on its compliance cost, a relationship which is described in the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: Firms with compliance cost 1Qc ≤ will choose strategy
00f , firms with 
21 QcQ ≤≤ will choose strategy
10f , and firms with compliance cost 2Qc ≥  will choose 
strategy 11f ; where 1111 FdpQ =  and 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )VVVVV
VCVCVVCVCV
ttttt
tttttFdptttttFdp
Q
2211122122
22212122211111122122111222
2 11
111
ββββ
βββββββ
−−+−
−−−+−−+−
=  
 
 
01
1
00
1 EE =
10
1E  
11
1E  
2Q  1Q  Compliance cost, c 
Expected 
costs 
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 With the inclusion of a detection parameter, the Harrington/Friesen results hold.  
First, targeting is only feasible if the agency’s goal is partial compliance. Full compliance 
can never be achieved as firms with compliance cost greater than 2Q  will always be in 
violation. Second, a firm in the target group 2G  can be induced to comply even if its 
compliance cost exceed the expected fine, 222 Fdp .  
 When we assume that detection is imperfect, the available strategies remain the 
same. However, the threshold points 1Q  and 2Q  will move.  The effect of imperfect 
detection on 1Q  and 2Q  in the target group differs the effect on the non target group, as 
described in the following propositions. 
 
Proposition 2a: Given 0,,, 2121 >FFpp  and a uniform firm distribution, imperfect 
detection in group 1 lowers the threshold point 1Q and raises 2Q , thus increasing the 
number of firms that adopt the 10f  strategy. 
Proposition 2b: Given 0,,, 2121 >FFpp  and a uniform firm distribution, imperfect 
detection in 2 lowers the threshold point 2Q , thus reducing the number of firms that 
adopt the 10f  strategy. 
 
 Proof for proposition 2.a and 2.b can be obtained by calculating the first 
derivative of the threshold points, with respect to the detection parameter.   
 0
1
1 >
dd
dQ
  0
1
2 <
dd
dQ
 
 0
2
2 =
dd
dQ
  0
2
2 >
dd
dQ
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 As the first derivative of 1Q with respect to the detection parameter in 1G  is 
positive, lower detection is associated with lower 1Q . This means that some
00f  firms 
will change their strategy into 10f  because the expected cost of violating is lower due to 
the possibility of escaping detection. The sign of the first derivative of 2Q with respect to 
detection parameter in 1G  has interesting consequence. Imperfect detection in group 1 
will cause 2Q  to increase. This means that some firms that choose 
11f  under perfect 
detection will adopt 10f  under imperfect detection. In other words, some (former) 11f  
firms will comply in 2G . The benefit of complying in 2G  for such a firm comes from two 
sources; (1) a reduction in the expected cost while in 2G  because the firm can avoid a 
penalty with certainty, and (2) the expected benefit of being in 1G , which rises because of 
the  possibility of escaping detection. As long as this expected benefit exceeds the 
compliance cost, firms will change their strategy from 11f  to 10f . 
 The first derivative of 1Q  and 2Q with respect to 2d indicates that imperfect 
detection in 2G  lowers the threshold 2Q , while 1Q  remains the same. Smaller 2Q means 
that some firms that adopt the 10f  strategy under perfect detection will choose 11f  under 
imperfect detection. Imperfect detection in 2G  reduces the expected cost of violating in 
2G , and thus the incentive to violate increases.  
 Since the effect of imperfect detection on 2Q differs between the target group and 
the non target group, the net impact would depend on size of the marginal effect of 
imperfect detection in each group. A further examination reveals that the marginal effect 
of imperfect detection in the target group is greater than the (absolute) marginal effect of 
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imperfect detection in the non target group ( ).// 1222 dddQdddQ >  This means that 
given the same level of detection rate, 2Q  will be at a lower point. Consequently, the 
number of firms that adopt the 11f strategy will increase. 
 
Implication for Testing the Harrington Model 
 We have shown that adding imperfect detection does not change Harrington’s 
prediction regarding firms’ available strategies. However, the zone for the 00f  strategy is 
reduced, while the zone for the 11f strategy is expanded as the result of imperfect 
detection.  
 Studies that were designed to test Harrington’s prediction have been use 
experimental and nonexperimental (observational) methods.  Strong support for 
Harrington’s prediction comes from laboratory experiments conducted by Cason and 
Gangadharan (2004). They found that when the probability that an inspected compliant 
moves back to the non target group is high (0.9), most of the subjects behave as predicted 
by the Harrington model. The consistency rate – defined as the proportion of correct 
prediction for each strategy – for the 00f  , 10f  and 11f strategies are 89%, 94%, and 
67% respectively. 
 On the other hand, nonexperimental studies only partially support Harrington’s 
prediction. Helland (1998a) empirically tests the existence of the 10f  strategy. His results 
show that inspections that did not detect any violation are not associated with a higher 
likelihood of firms violating in the next period. Thus he claims that there is no evidence 
for the 10f  strategy.  However, he found that previous violations are positively correlated 
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with the current violation, which can be interpreted as the 11f strategy. This positive 
correlation between previous violation and current violation can also be found in Helland 
(1998b), Stafford (2002, 2005), and Scholz and Wang (2006). 
 Our extension to Harington’s model can be used to explain the difference between 
the experimental and nonexperimental empirical evidence. As we have shown, the zone 
for 11f  firms expands as a result of imperfect detection.  If the firms are uniformly 
distributed, this implies that we will observe more 11f firms. Since Helland (1998a, 
1998b), Stafford (2002, 2005) and Scholz and Wang (2006) use major facilities who 
likely have a high cost of complying with regulations, there is a great chance that the 
majority of their observations fall in the 11f  zone.  
 Three additional reasons may also account for the difference between the 
conclusions drawn by experimental and nonexperimental studies. First, the theoretical 
model, and the experimental implementations, assumes that each facility knows with 
certainty the group to which it belongs. In reality, facilities do not have such information. 
Having no information on the group to which it belongs, the firm may miscalculate the 
expected cost of each decision, thus generating results that are inconsistent with the 
theoretical prediction. Second, the nonexperimental studies fail to categorize firms based 
on their compliance costs. In Harrington’s model, firms can be easily categorized into 
low, medium or high compliance cost categories simply by comparing their compliance 
costs with the threshold points. The nonexperimental studies have used different proxies 
for compliance costs, but they do not estimate the thresholds 1Q  and 2Q , which makes it 
difficult to categorize each firm by their compliance costs. Without proper categorization 
of each firm, the results are biased toward the group with the most observations. In the 
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nonexperimental studies, all observations are major facilities. Thus, it is not surprising if 
they confirm only the existence of the 11f strategy. Third, there is a possibility that it 
takes time to correct a violation, which is not permitted in Harrington’s model or the 
experimental design of Cason and Gangadaran.  If violations are indeed difficult to 
correct, the result would be biased toward observing the 11f strategy.  Thus for a variety 
of reasons, one should not be surprised that Cason and Gangadaran’s experimental study 
confirms Harrington’s predictions, whereas the nonexperimental studies fail to do so.  
The contexts of the nonexperimental studies are unlikely to satisfy the assumptions of 
Harrington’s model.  Moreover, these studies are not well suited to testing Harrington’s 
model because of the samples they use and the modeling strategies they adopt.  
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APPENDIX A 
 LOG LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION OF MODIFIED DCE  
 
 Figure A.1 describes how we categorize each observation in the modified DCE 
model, which is similar to Helland (1998a) and Scholz and Wang (2006). It is shown that 
there are three separate decisions; two are made by facility (violation and self report), and 
one is made by the regulator (inspection). Since the dependent variable of each decision 
is binary variable, we use latent variable approach of binary-choice model to model the 
probability of each decision.  
Violation Equation 
 Let * ,, tiVY denotes the violation decision made by facility i at time t., which is 
modeled as a function of vector of exogenous variables VX , and a random error 
term tiV ,,ε .  
 tiVVtiVtiV XY ,,,,
*
,, εβ +=       (A.1) 
Exogenous variable VX  consists of some control variables, and lagged values of penalty 
(which is our variable of interest). As in the standard latent variable model, we can not 
directly observe * ,, tiVY .  We can only observe tiVY ,, , where: 
  1,, =tiVY  (violate) 0
*
,, >tiVYif  
  0,, =tiVY (comply) 0
*
,, ≤tiVYif  
Under the distributional assumption on the error term tiV ,,ε , the probability of violation is 
equal to ( ) ( ) ( )VtiVtiVVtiVtiV XVXPYP βεβ ,,,,,,,, 01 =>+== , where ( )•V  is the cumulative 
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distribution function for the violation equation.33 Consequently, the predicted probability 
of facility i is not in violation at time t is ( )VtiVXV β,,1−  
Inspection Decision 
 Similarly to violation decision, the regulator’s decision to perform inspection * ,, tiIY  
can be modeled as a function of vector of exogenous variables IX , and a random error 
term tiI ,,ε , such that: 
 tiIItiItiI xY ,,,,
*
,, εβ +=       (A.2) 
  1,, =tiIY (inspect) 0
*
,, >tiIYif  
  0,, =tiIY (no inspection) 0
*
,, ≤tiIYif  
As in the case for violation decision, we can only observe tiIY ,,  instead of 
*
,, tiIY . Assuming 
that the error term follows normal distribution function, the probability of inspection 
( )ItiIXI β,,  is the cumulative normal distribution function for the inspection equation.  
Self Report Equation 
 The self report equation represents the facility’s decision to submit a self-report 
its violation, which is modeled as a function of a vector of exogenous variables SX , and a 
random error term tiS ,,ε . 
 tiSStiStiS xY ,,,,
*
,, εβ +=       (A.3) 
  1,, =tiSY (self report)  0
*
,, >tiSYif  
  0,, =tiSY (no self report) 0
*
,, ≤tiSYif  
                                                 
33 The distribution of the error term can be normal or logistic. In this study, since we also provide the result 
under probit and Chamberlain conditional random effects probit, we decided to use normal link function.  
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As in violation and inspection decision, we assume that the error term follow normal 
distribution. This gives us the probability of self report ( )StiSXS β,, , where ( )•S  is the 
cumulative normal distribution function for the self report equation.  
 The estimation of DCE is performed by maximizing the likelihood of different 
events shown in figure A.1. The three-equation model leads to five outcomes; (1) 
inspected violators, (2) inspected compliers, (3) self report violators, (4) compliers that 
are not inspected, and (5) violators with no inspection and no self report.  
 The likelihood functions of each outcome are as follow; 
The log likelihood function of inspected violators 
( ) ( )∑
===
=
0,1,1
log
SIV YYY
IIiVViIV XIXVL ββ       (A.4) 
The log likelihood function of inspected compliers 
( )[ ] ( )∑
===
−=
0,1,0
1log
SIV YYY
IIiVViIC XIXVL ββ     (A.5) 
The log likelihood function of self-report violators 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )∑
===
−=
1,0,1
1log
SIV YYY
SSiIIiVViSR XSXIXVL βββ    (A.6) 
The log likelihood function of not inspecting a compliant 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]∑
===
−−=
0,0,0
11log
SIV YYY
IIiVViNIC XIXVL ββ     (A.7) 
The log likelihood function of not inspecting violator that do not self report 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]∑
===
−−=
0,0,1
11log
SIV YYY
SSiIIiVViNSR XSXIXVL βββ    (A.8) 
Since compliers that are not inspected are observationally equivalent with violators that 
are not inspected and do not submit self report, the likelihood function of the last two 
group are combined. Thus, the likelihood function of modified DCE is as follows; 
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( ) ( ) ( )
( )[ ] ( )
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]{
( )
( )[ ] ( )[ ]}SSiIIi
NSRNICi
SSiIIiVVi
SRi
SSiIIiVVi
ICi
IIiVVi
IVi
IIiVViSIVDCE
XSXI
XSXIXV
XSXIXV
XIXV
XIXVL
ββ
βββ
βββ
ββ
βββββ
−−+
−−+
−−+
−+
=
∑
∑
∑
∑
∪∈
∈
∈
∈
11
11log
11log
1log
log,,
   
 For DCE model with two sided expectation simultaneity, we use the same 
approach in categorizing each observation. The only difference is that we have 
expectation variable in equation A.1 and A.2, in addition to the original list of covariates. 
The detail of the derivation for two-sided expectation simultaneity DCE model is 
available in Feinstein (1990). 
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Figure A.1. Modified DCE Model 
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APPENDIX B 
ARGUMENTS FOR COVARIATES IN  
THE EMPIRICAL MODEL  
 
Violation Decision  
 In NPDES database, there are six categories of non compliance; (1) compliance 
schedule, (2) effluent violation (monthly average), (3) non monthly average effluent 
violation, (4) compliance schedule monitoring report, (5) non receipt of Discharge 
Monitoring Report (DMR), and (6) reportable non compliance. The first five violations 
are considered as significant violation, while the last one is considered as non significant 
violation. In this study, we use two measures of violations: (1) Effluent violation which 
consists of monthly and non monthly average effluent violation, and (2) significant 
violation, which consists of the first five of the above categories.  
 We model plants’ violation decision as a function of lagged penalty, lagged 
compliance status, regulator’s reputation, demographic characteristic, and probability of 
inspection. The arguments for inclusion as well as the expected sign of each variable are 
discussed in the following.  
 Probability of Inspection: Several empirical regulatory compliance studies—such 
as Gray and Deily (1996), Nadeau (1997), and Earnhart (2004)--confirm theoretical 
prediction that compliance decision is also affected by the probability of inspection. 
While Feinstein (1990) has laid out the methodology for DCE model that incorporates 
expectation term, no previous DCE studies has included expected inspection in the 
compliance decision. If plants do indeed take into account the probability of inspection in 
making compliance decision, then leaving this variable out would generate omitted 
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variable bias. On the other hand, if in fact plants do not take into account probability of 
inspection, including this variable will only affect the efficiency of the estimates. We 
expect negative relationship between probability of inspection and violation decision. In 
other words, the higher is the probability of being inspected, the less likely the plant will 
violate. For comparison purpose, we also provide the result without expectation term.  
 Lagged penalty: We assume that regulator never mistakenly punish a complying 
firm. Therefore, only caught violators will be given penalties. Once a violation is 
detected, the regulator will calculate the amount of penalty such that it increases the 
firm’s incentive to comply.34 Hence, we expect that the larger the amount of penalty, the 
lower the likelihood of firm to violate in the subsequent period. In the very few literature 
that include penalty in the compliance decision, three studies found that penalty is an 
effective deterrence variable (Feinstein 1989; Stafford 2002; Scholz and Wang 2006). 
Shimshack and Ward (2005), however, fail to detect the effectiveness of penalty to 
reduce violation. As previous theoretical and previous studies suggest, we expect 
negative relationship between lagged penalty and violation decision.  
 Lagged Intermediate Enforcement Actions (IEAs): It is a common practice in 
regulatory enforcement that the regulator allows the violating facilities to go only with 
warning rather than just giving them penalty in every detected violation. In fact, 
enforcements with zero-penalty contribute the largest share in the CWA enforcement. 
Between 1990 and 2004, only 14 thousand cases (out of 167 thousand enforcements) are 
with penalties. Since most of enforcements are without penalties, it is of interest to see 
                                                 
34 Interim CWA Settlement Penalty Policy (1995) designs penalty such that (1) it is large enough to deter 
non compliance, and (2) ensure a level of playing field by ensuring that violators do not obtain an economic 
advantage over their competitors.  
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how facilities react to warnings. In this study, we combine all enforcements with zero-
penalty into one category called intermediate enforcement actions.35 We expect that 
facilities will be more likely to comply after being issued a warning, as continue violating 
is considered as lacking of “good faith” by the regulator, and lead them to increased 
penalty.36  
 Regulator reputation: The compliance decision made by facilities can also be 
affected by the regulator stringency in conducting inspection and imposing penalties. The 
effect of a penalty might go beyond merely the penalized plant if other plants view the 
imposed fine as the indicator of regulator’s stringency. If regulator reputation does affect 
compliance decision, then leaving this variable out will lead to underestimate the efficacy 
of fines and other sanctions (Shimshack and Ward 2005). There are two measures of 
reputation that we use; (1) the amount of penalty given by the regulator in the same 
jurisdiction (state), and (2) number of IEAs in the same jurisdiction. We normalize the 
reputation variables with the number of major facility in the state. We expect negative 
relationship between these two measures of reputation with violation decision.  
 Lagged compliance status: Harrington (1988) argues that firm’s compliance 
decision depends on its compliance cost. Firms with low compliance cost will always 
comply, while those with high compliance cost will always violate. Firms with medium 
cost of compliance will make a decision based on previous inspection result. Firms found 
in the state of violation in the previous period will likely to comply in the next period. An 
empirical test performed by Helland (1998a) fails to confirm Harrington’s prediction, and 
                                                 
35 The detailed list of formal and informal actions in CWA is available at 
http://www.epa.gov/echo/dfr_data_dictionary.html, accessed November, 2007. 
 
36 USEPA (1995b)  
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is consistent with the view that “[V]iolations are difficult to correct and hence are not the 
best means for firms to signal their desire to cooperate with a regulator once a violation is 
detected.”   
 In order to be consistent with theoretical model, lagged compliance status is 
measured based on the outcome of previous inspections. For inspected compliant the 
value equals to one if the facility was inspected and no violation was detected. 
Meanwhile for previous violation, we include violations from two sources; inspection and 
self report.  
 Demographic characteristics: Recent regulatory compliance studies, such as 
Earnhart (2004), Stafford (2005), and Scholz and Wang (2006), found that social 
demographic characteristics have statistically significant impact on firms’ compliance 
decision. We will use several measures of demographic variables; unemployment, 
percent of urban area, race composition, percent of owner occupant, and educational 
attainment.  
 Unemployment: There are three studies that include unemployment in the 
violation equation. Brehm and Hamilton (1996) and Shimshack and Ward (2005) found 
that unemployment have negative relationship with violation, while Earnhart (2004) 
found it positively related. As the empirical evidence is mixed, the coefficient of this 
variable is not signed.  
 Share of urban area: Whether a violation by a facility is easily visible to the 
public can also be affected by the initial environmental quality in the facility’s site. A 
violation by a facility located in the urban area is relatively less visible compare to 
similar violation in the rural area because the urban area is more likely to have lower 
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environmental quality due to higher activities. Therefore, we expect that facilities located 
in urban area are more likely to violate. Unfortunately, the data does not distinguish 
whether the plant is located in urban or rural area. As solution, we use the percentage of 
urban area in the county as a proxy variable. We are confident that the share of urban area 
is a good proxy variable for location, as greater urban area means more activities and is 
usually associated with lower environmental quality, hence will produce the same 
qualitative result. 
 Race composition: We use the percentage of white population in the county to 
represent race composition. As the majority race in the U.S., we consider the higher the 
share of white population, the higher is the pressure for the firm to comply with the 
regulation. Two previous studies have included racial composition in firms’ violation 
decision. Scholz and Wang (2006) found that the percentage of Hispanic and Black 
population have positive correlation with violation, while Shimshack and Ward (2005) 
did not detect the significant impact of racial structure 
 Share of owner occupant: We argue that property owner has direct interest to put 
pressure on facility to maintain environmental quality, since any violations that lead to 
increased pollution will result in a decrease in property value. Moreover, as taxpayers, 
property owners can also affect local authority decision in allowing or rejecting a facility 
to operate in their area. We expect that the higher the share of owner occupant, the bigger 
is the pressure for the firm to comply.  
 Educational attainment: We use the percentage of population with bachelor or 
higher degree to represent educational attainment. We argue people with high educational 
attainment are more likely to have better understanding about the hazardous impact of 
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environmental violation. We also expect that well-educated people have better ability to 
put social pressure on facility or convincing the regulator to enforce regulation towards 
violating facilities. Therefore, we expect negative relationship between educational 
attainment and violation decision.  
Proxies for Unobserved Heterogeneity  
 The common practice in the estimating model with panel data format is by taking 
into account unobserved heterogeneity, either with fixed effect or random effect 
specification. Unfortunately, the likelihood function for DCE that takes into account 
unobserved heterogeneity has not been developed yet.37  
 We are fully aware that ignoring unobserved heterogeneity will affect the 
estimation result. Our attempt to capture (time invariant) plant’s specific tendency to 
comply is by choosing variables of most direct theoretical concern, then take the average 
value over the period, and include as additional covariates. Introducing average variables 
ix - in addition to their own original values itx - means we are estimating the effect of 
those variables holding the time average fixed (Wooldridge 2002). A random effect 
probit model that allows some dependence between individual specific effect and 
covariates also use similar average variables (Chamberlain 1980). Consequently, we can 
compare the DCE model with Chamberlain’s approach since we are using the exact same 
list of covariates. 
                                                 
37 In cross section format, DCE model calculates the probability that plant i is inspected conditional on the 
plant is in violation. Under panel data format, we observe V detected violations in I number of inspection in 
T period. However, the actual number of violation (V*) is V ≤  V* ≤  T. In model with complete detection 
process like fixed effect logit, the likelihood function is conditioned based on detected violation (which is 
assumed equals to actual violation). In panel DCE, since detection is an incomplete process, the actual 
violation is at least equal to the number of detected violation. The challenge lies in how to derive the 
likelihood function for fixed effect DCE is to find V* that will be used as condition in maximizing the 
likelihood function.  
81 
 
 
 There are three variables that we think have the most direct impact on compliance 
decision; inspection, intermediate enforcement action, and penalty.38 Regulator will 
conduct inspection more frequently towards facilities with larger (perceived) propensity 
to violate. Once a violation is detected, the regulator has two choices: issue intermediate 
enforcement actions (warning / compliance order) or penalize the plant. Large average 
value of these variables indicates greater facility’s inherent factors to violate. Therefore, 
we expect positive relationship of the average values of these variables with compliance 
decision.39  
Other Control Variables  
 Industrial classification: The NPDES database records four types of industrial 
classification.40 However, existing environmental compliance studies only focus on one 
type of industry.41  Including industrial classification dummy would help us to see if there 
are differences in compliance behavior among different industries, as claimed by Scholz 
and Wang (2006). 
 Seasonal dummies: There are two reasons for including seasonal dummy in the 
violation equation. First, the emission level is closely related to the production level, and 
production level may vary by season due to demand. Second, from the auditor point of 
                                                 
 
38 These variables are also used in Shimshack and Ward (2005) 
 
39 We also estimate the model without average variables. Excluding these three variables cause the sign for 
self penalty to be positive which is inconsistent with theory. 
 
40 The industries are; (1) primary industry listed on Effluent Limitations Guidelines (ELG), (2)  municipal 
facility, which is determined by from SIC code (SIC 4952) and ownership type, (3) facility listed on ELG 
but not considered as primary industry, and (4) industry that has not been categorized by ELG. 
 
41 Scholz and Wang (2006) exclude municipal facilities as public ownership creates different budget 
constraints that alter their responses to enforcement. Meanwhile, Eanrhart (2004) focuses only on 
municipal waste water treatment. He argues that since wastewater treatment plant must be located in every 
community, it avoids potential endogeneity problem between location and community characteristics. 
Other studies do not explicitly indicate the industrial category used in their studies 
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view, inspections are sometimes constrained by weather condition. For instance, a really 
cold winter may prevent auditors from performing inspection.  
Inspection Decision 
 Although there are various types of inspection, we will not distinguish inspection 
either by types or by inspectors. In our formulation, inspection is modeled as a function 
of lagged number of inspection, lagged compliance status, lagged penalty, demographic 
characteristic, number of facility (in the same 2-digit SIC) in the region, number of 
previous enforcement in the region, demographic characteristic, and expected violation 
rate. Inspection decision is measured by dummy variable, where 1 indicates inspection is 
performed, zero otherwise.  
 Probability of violation: Unless the number of facilities is extremely small, 
regulator will not be able to inspect all facilities in its jurisdiction due to resource 
constraint. Theoretical models suggest that regulator will direct the inspection towards 
those who are more likely to violate. Therefore, we expect positive relationship between 
inspection and probability of violation.  
 Probability of self report: With limited budget constraint, self report can be used 
as screening mechanism for the regulator to perform inspection. Although firms have a 
choice to misreport, there is no evidence of strategic non-reporting or false reporting by 
firms.42 After all, misreporting is punishable by law. Therefore, it is better for the 
regulator to direct inspection towards those who are less likely to submit self report.  
 Lagged inspection: Whether a facility is inspected in a given period depends on 
the strategy used by the regulator. Laplante and Rilstone (1996) suggest that plants with 
large number of cumulative inspections will be less likely to be inspected if the regulator 
                                                 
42 See Laplante and Rilstone (1996) and Shimshack and Wards (2005).  
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adopt sampling-without-replacement strategy (i.e., to visit as many plants as possible), 
like the one which is practiced by Quebec Ministry of Environment. In U.S. case, 
regulator is required to inspect major facility at least once a year (Shimshack and Ward 
2005). However, we found many cases in the dataset where inspections have been absent 
for more than a year.43 This discrepancy between law and practice requires us to expand 
the length of lagged inspection beyond just one year. As the law requires major facility to 
be inspected once a year, we expect positive relationship between lagged inspections and 
current inspection decision.  
 Lagged number of violation: A facility that has been found in violation in the 
previous period will be given more attention by the regulator. This premise is supported 
both from theoretical and empirical point of view. In the theoretical side, a model by 
Harrington (1988) suggests that a detected violator will have greater probability of being 
inspected.44 Meanwhile, the support from empirical work comes from the studies by 
Helland (1998a) and Nadeau (1997). 
 Unlike in violation decision, we use the cumulative number of violation instead of 
previous inspection outcome. Using number of violations implies that we include 
violations from two sources, inspection and self report. And we consider that this is a 
good measure since the regulator is more concerned about the extent of non compliance 
regardless how it gets the information about non compliance. With regard to the expected 
sign, we expect positive relationship between lagged of number of non compliance and 
                                                 
 
43 Rechtschaffen (2004) quotes studies that indicate that states authority fail to carry out inspection, which 
is consistent with what we found in the dataset 
 
44 To be specific, a detected violator in group 1 (group of plants with low probability of inspection and low 
penalty) will have a certain probability to move to group 2 (group of plants that face higher enforcement 
scrutiny, i.e., higher probability of inspection and higher penalty). A detected violator in group 2 will 
remain in group 2.  
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inspection decision. However, the effect of non compliance will diminish overtime, in the 
sense that non compliance in period t will have a larger in 1+t  than 2+t  and so on.  
 Lagged penalty: The amount of penalty indicates the extent of violations. The 
more severe the violation, the higher is the penalty. While this argument is supported 
theoretically by Harrington (1988), unfortunately—among the very scant literature of 
environmental compliance that include penalty--there is no single empirical study that 
incorporate penalty into inspection decision. As the magnitude of penalty indicates the 
severity of violation, we expect that the larger the magnitude of penalty, the greater the 
probability of being inspected in the next period.  
 Lagged IEAs: The effect of IEAs on the probability of inspection is the same as 
the effect of lagged penalty, as this is another indicator of the degree of violation. 
Therefore, as in the lagged penalty, we expect positive relationship between the number 
of lagged IEA with inspection decision.  
 Lagged report violation: Under CWA, major facilities are required to submit 
monthly DMR. Failure to submit this report is considered as non compliance. We expect 
that facilities that fail to submit the required reports are more likely to be inspected. 
 Demographic characteristics: Similar to compliance decision, demographic 
characteristic also found to be an important consideration for the regulator in conducting 
inspection. We use the same list of demographic characteristics as in the violation 
equation. The only difference is on the expected signs for some variables. 
 Unemployment: The support of including unemployment as covariate in 
inspection decision is based on the environmental federalism-regulatory literature model 
prediction that the costs and benefits of environmental protection determine the 
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stringency of enforcement.45  While the benefit of stringent environmental enforcement is 
pollution reduction, the general cost includes profit loss and potential plant closing. In 
empirical studies, unemployment has been included as it reflects the opportunity cost of 
the lost jobs if the plant does close as the result of stringent enforcement. The evidence 
from empirical studies, however, is mixed.46 Therefore the coefficient for this variable is 
not signed. 
 Share of urban area:  We use similar argument as in the violation equation, that 
violations in the rural area are relatively more visible compare to those in urban. Since 
facilities in urban are more likely to violate due to less visibility, it is better for the 
regulator to direct inspection toward facilities in the urban area. For the same reason used 
in violation equation, we use percentage of urban area as proxy. We expect positive 
relationship between percent of urban area and inspection decision. 
 Race composition:  Scholz and Wang (2006) use the percent of Black and 
Hispanic residents to test whether there is an environmental injustice from the regulator 
in performing inspection. While they failed to reject null with regard to the correlation 
between inspection and percent of Black residents, they found that proportion of Hispanic 
residents is negatively related with inspection decision. In this study, we use the share of 
white population to test if there is environmental injustice. If the environmental injustice 
indeed exists, we expect positive correlation between percentage of white population and 
inspection decision. 
                                                 
45 See for instance Peltzman (1976) and Oates (1988) 
 
46 Helland (1998b) found similar result with theoretical prediction, while Deily and Gray (1991) and Gray 
and Deily (1996) found it positive and significant 
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 Share of owner occupant: A strict environmental enforcement is usually desirable 
by property owners, since environmental degradation will affect property values 
negatively. And as tax payer, property owners can put the pressure on the local 
government to supply an adequate amount of public good (in this case, good 
environmental quality). As the share of property owner live in the area is higher, local 
authority will face a greater pressure to enforce the regulation. Therefore, we expect 
positive relationship between the share of owner occupant and the inspection decision.  
 Educational attainment: As has been explained in the violation decision, people 
with high educational attainment are more likely to have better understanding about the 
hazardous impact of environmental violation, and also expected to have better ability to 
put social pressure on facility or convincing the regulator to enforce regulation towards 
violating facilities. The effect of educational attainment on inspection decision depends 
on the effectiveness of social pressure being put on facility. The more effective the social 
pressure, the lesser is the need to perform inspection. In other words, if we found 
educational attainment is negatively related with violation decision, then we would 
expect negative relationship between educational attainment with inspection decision.  
 Government budget: Helland (1998a, 1998b) found that government budget is 
statistically significant in determining inspection decision. We use government 
expenditure on natural resource protection (obtained from census bureau) as proxy for 
government budget, and normalize it with number of plants in the state. Similar to 
Helland’s findings, we expect positive relationship between budget per plant with 
inspection decision.  
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 Number of facility in the same 2-digit SIC: Another constraint to perform 
inspection comes from the number of facilities in the jurisdiction. Helland (1998a) finds 
that number of (total) manufacturing facilities is negatively related with inspection 
decision, which is not surprising. In this study, since we already use the number of total 
plants to normalize the government budget, we will use different measure for number of 
plants. We will use the number of plants in the same industry (2-digit SIC). As the 
number of plant in the industry increases, total pollution will increase and the net benefit 
of performing inspection towards the industry increases. Therefore, we expect positive 
correlation between inspection and number of plant in the same 2-digit SIC.  
 Other control variables: Similar to violation decision, we also additional control 
variables such as seasonal dummies and industrial classification dummies. We use similar 
approach as in violation decision for proxies of unobserved heterogeneity. The only 
difference is that we exclude the average number of inspection. 
Self Report Decision 
 Since plants that submit self report are those who are in violation, we argue that 
plants decisions to self report are closely related the compliance decision. Therefore, we 
model plants’ decision to self-report as a function of lagged compliance status, lagged 
penalty, lagged intermediate enforcement actions, lagged report violation and number of 
facilities in the same 2-digit SIC. We exclude demographic variables appeared in the 
violation equation since self report is a matter between facility and regulator, and 
irrelevant with the local community characteristics.  
 Probability of Inspection: As in violation decision, we also consider that the 
probability of inspection affects self report decision. However, the expected sign depends 
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on the effectiveness of probability of inspection in the violation decision. If it is negative 
and statistically significant in the violation decision, then we would expect the probability 
of inspection has a negative sign in the self report decision. As the probability of 
inspection reduces the probability of violation, consequently it will reduce the probability 
of self report.  
 Lagged compliance status: The compliance status that we use is based on 
previous inspection outcome. That is, we create a dummy variable equal to one if a 
violation was detection during previous inspection. Because it takes time to correct a 
violation—as found by Helland (1998a)--a detected violator will have higher likelihood 
to submit self-report violation in the subsequent period in order to avoid severe penalty 
for its inability to comply. Therefore, we expect positive relationship between lagged 
violations with self report decision.  
 Lagged report violation: Under CWA, major facilities are required to submit 
monthly DMR. Failure to submit this report is considered as non compliance. Another 
form of report violation is failure to submit compliance schedule report. We expect that 
facilities that fail to submit the required reports have higher probability of self reporting, 
as failure to do so will be considered by the regulator as lacking of ‘good faith’, hence 
will face more stringent enforcement.  
 Lagged penalty: The data PCS dataset indicates that enforcement with non-zero 
penalty account only less than ten percent of total CWA enforcement. It means that only 
serious and/or repeated violators receive monetary penalty. The sign of lagged penalty in 
self report equation depends on the effectiveness of penalty in deterring violation. If the 
penalty is effective in deterring non compliance, it means that the penalized violator will 
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comply in the next period, hence there is no need to submit self report. Thus, we expect 
negative relationship between lagged penalty and self-report. However 
 Lagged IEAs:  As we have mentioned in violation and inspection decision, 
intermediate enforcement actions reflect the severity of violation. We expect that the sign 
of IEAs on self report equation will be similar to its sign in the violation decision. If 
Harrington prediction is correct, then we expect negative relationship between lagged 
IEAs and self report. On the other hand, if our findings in the compliance decision are 
similar as in Helland (1998a)—which confirm the view that violations are difficult to 
correct--then we expect the positive relationship between lagged IEAs and self report 
decision. After all, it is better for the facilities to submit self report as they have higher 
probability of being inspected.  
 Number of facility in the same 2-digit SIC: Under the new penalty regime, the 
regulator will reduce or waive the penalty if the violating facility submit a self report. The 
benefit of submitting self report is greater in an industry with smaller number of plants 
because the violation is more visible. Therefore, we expect that the smaller the number of 
plant in an industry, the more likely the violating plant to self report.  
 Other Control Variables: As in the violation decision and inspection decision, we 
also use industrial and seasonal dummies to control for differences due to industrial type 
and seasonal fluctuation. 
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APPENDIX C 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
 
 To ensure that the results presented in chapter III are the robust results, we also 
estimate the model under different dataset and specification. The summary regression 
results in chapter III and additional robustness tests are presented in Table 20. 
Regression Result using Significant Noncompliance Measure  
 The results that we present in chapter III are based on effluent violation. As 
robustness check, we also estimate the model under alternative measure of 
noncompliance. By NPDES definition, a facility is considered in significant 
noncompliance if it has at least one of the following criteria; (1) commit effluent 
violation, (2) fail to meet compliance schedule, (3) fail to submit compliance schedule 
monitoring report, or (4) fail to submit monthly Discharge Monitoring Report (DMR). 
 Since significant noncompliance definition covers three more types of violation, 
we have more non complying firms in the dataset (compare to using effluent violation 
measure). With the same explanatory variable, this means that we expect smaller 
coefficients and more insignificant variables from the new regression. Tables 21-22 
present the estimation results using significant noncompliance measure for non-municipal 
facilities and SIC 49. 
 The qualitative result presented in Table 21 is not much different from Table 11 
of chapter III. Using significant noncompliance measures indeed lower the magnitude of 
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parameter for some variables (like reputation penalty lagged 1-4 quarters and 
unemployment rate). Other coefficients remain in the similar magnitude.  
 When we use SIC 49, the qualitative results of both measures are similar. The 
notable difference is self-penalty lagged 1-4 quarters becomes statistically insignificant 
using significant noncompliance measure in all specifications. 
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Table 20: Summary of Robustness Test 
 
Used in  
Chapter III Robustness Check 
Notes 
Period 1997-2004 1990-2004 
1990-1996 
We do not find self-penalty 
statistically significant using 
1990-2004 dataset 
 
Regression using 1990-1996 
data generate positive 
coefficients on self penalty 
Violation measures Effluent violations Significant violations 
All types of violations 
All measures provide similar 
qualitative results, except using 
SIC 26 dataset.  
 
Under significant violation 
measure, we fail to reject null 
for self-penalty using SIC 26 
dataset.  
Penalty measures Continuous Dummy  The notable change exists when 
we use non-municipal facilities.  
 
When measured by dummy 
variable, self-penalty is 
significant in non-municipal 
group.  
 
However, once reputation 
variables are included, the 
effects become insignificant. 
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Used in  
Chapter III Robustness Check 
Notes 
Reputation variables 
measures 
Normalized by number of 
facility 
Un-normalized Two measures provide the 
same qualitative results 
Lagged compliance status 
measures 
Previous inspection outcome Number of noncompliance 
Distributed noncompliance 
dummy 
All three measures provide 
consistent qualitative results.  
 
 
 
Average enforcement 
variables 
Average enforcement variables 
(penalty, IEA, and inspection) 
are included 
Average enforcement variables 
are excluded 
Excluding average enforcement 
variables causes the coefficient 
of self-penalty to be positive in 
each methodology 
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Table 21: Significant Violation Decision under DCE (Non Municipal Facilities) 
Specification 
  A B C D E 
Probability of inspection       -1.7204 ***    -1.6171 *** 
        (0.4455)      (0.4187)   
Penalty (Self) 1-4 quarters ago -0.0134 * -0.0121   -0.0092   -0.0112   -0.0084   
  (0.0073)  (0.0074)   (0.0074)   (0.0075)   (0.0075)   
Penalty (Self) 5-8 quarters ago -0.0156 ** -0.0119   -0.0111   -0.0132 * -0.0123   
  (0.0075)  (0.0076)   (0.0076)   (0.0076)   (0.0076)   
Penalty (Reputation) 1-4 quarters ago   -0.0013   0.0014   -0.0022   -0.0003   
    (0.0046)   (0.0046)   (0.0047)   (0.0047)   
Penalty (Reputation) 5-8 quarters ago   -0.0214 *** -0.0159 *** -0.0209 *** -0.0162 *** 
    (0.0046)   (0.0048)   (0.0048)   (0.0049)   
IEA (Self) 1-4 quarters ago 0.0087  0.0215 *** 0.0263 *** 0.0239 *** 0.0252 *** 
  (0.0075)  (0.0081)   (0.0082)   (0.0083)   (0.0083)   
IEA (Self) 5-8 quarters ago -0.0089  0.0045   0.0045   0.0060   0.0027   
  (0.0081)  (0.0085)   (0.0085)   (0.0087)   (0.0088)   
IEA (Reputation) 1-4 quarters ago   -0.0289 *** -0.0275 *** -0.0245 *** -0.0228 *** 
    (0.0072)   (0.0073)   (0.0074)   (0.0075)   
IEA (Reputation) 5-8 quarters ago   -0.0142 ** -0.0123 * -0.0192 *** -0.0168 ** 
    (0.0070)   (0.0071)   (0.0070)   (0.0071)   
Inspected and no violation detected 1-4 quarters ago 0.1221 *** 0.1370 *** 0.0642 ** 0.1486 *** 0.0731 ** 
  (0.0263)  (0.0262)   (0.0321)   (0.0266)   (0.0330)   
Inspected and no violation detected 5-8 quarters ago -0.1102 *** -0.0970 *** -0.0489 * -0.0961 *** -0.0526 * 
  (0.0264)  (0.0263)   (0.0271)   (0.0267)   (0.0268)   
Number of significant violation 1-4 quarters ago 0.6591 *** 0.6488 *** 0.6412 *** 0.6532 *** 0.6428 *** 
  (0.0131)  (0.0131)   (0.0132)   (0.0132)   (0.0135)   
Number of significant violation 5-8quarters ago 0.0527 *** 0.0434 *** 0.0534 *** 0.0541 *** 0.0630 *** 
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Specification 
  A B C D E 
  (0.0140)  (0.0140)   (0.0143)   (0.0143)   (0.0145)   
Percent urban 0.1152 ** 0.1260 ** 0.0727   0.1376 ** 0.0942 * 
  (0.0524)  (0.0529)   (0.0547)   (0.0539)   (0.0551)   
Percent white 0.6485 *** 0.3976 *** 0.4218 *** 0.4626 *** 0.4672 *** 
  (0.0833)  (0.0863)   (0.0855)   (0.0894)   (0.0882)   
Unemployment rate 0.0093 * 0.0041   -0.0050   0.0031   0.0000   
  (0.0054)  (0.0055)   (0.0060)   (0.0059)   (0.0059)   
Percent of owner occupant -0.1995  0.0850   -0.0429   0.0231   0.0042   
  (0.1568)  (0.1627)   (0.1674)   (0.1738)   (0.1751)   
Percent of bachelor + graduate degree -0.6750 ** -0.9649 *** -1.1272 *** -1.2026 *** -1.1398 *** 
  (0.2650)  (0.2720)   (0.2762)   (0.2926)   (0.2931)   
Primary industry -0.1654  -0.0673   -0.0604   -0.1007   -0.0901   
  (0.2953)  (0.2965)   (0.2976)   (0.3008)   (0.3027)   
Not primary industry -0.1049  -0.0118   -0.0069   -0.0477   -0.0357   
  (0.2959)  (0.2971)   (0.2983)   (0.3015)   (0.3034)   
Not on ELG -0.0215  0.0685   0.0722   0.0467   0.0588   
  (0.2965)  (0.2977)   (0.2989)   (0.3020)   (0.3040)   
Average penalty 0.0227 *** 0.0251 *** 0.0253 *** 0.0267 *** 0.0271 *** 
  (0.0058)  (0.0059)   (0.0058)   (0.0059)   (0.0059)   
Average IEA 0.0884 * 0.2371 *** 0.2463 *** 0.2218 *** 0.2512 *** 
  (0.0525)  (0.0558)   (0.0555)   (0.0589)   (0.0593)   
Average inspection -0.8725 *** -0.8726 *** -0.1114   -0.8628 *** -0.1365   
  (0.0846)  (0.0826)   (0.2137)   (0.0831)   (0.2070)   
Constant -1.1759 *** -1.0746 *** -0.7319 ** -0.9168 *** -0.7225 ** 
  (0.3266)   (0.3277)   (0.3416)   (0.3383)   (0.3443)   
*, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively  
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Table 22: Significant Violation Decision under DCE (SIC 49) 
Specification 
  A B C D E 
Probability of inspection       -1.8016 ***    -1.7131 *** 
        (0.0882)      (0.0872)   
Penalty (Self) 1-4 quarters ago -0.0204 *** -0.0204 *** -0.0192 *** -0.0181 *** -0.0169 *** 
  (0.0044)  (0.0045)   (0.0045)   (0.0045)   (0.0046)   
Penalty (Self) 5-8 quarters ago -0.0021  -0.0012   -0.0049   -0.0015   -0.0034   
  (0.0045)  (0.0045)   (0.0045)   (0.0046)   (0.0046)   
Penalty (Reputation) 1-4 quarters ago   0.0018   0.0044   0.0041   0.0060 ** 
    (0.0029)   (0.0029)   (0.0030)   (0.0029)   
Penalty (Reputation) 5-8 quarters ago   -0.0195 *** -0.0124 *** -0.0210 *** -0.0152 *** 
    (0.0030)   (0.0030)   (0.0031)   (0.0030)   
IEA (Self) 1-4 quarters ago 0.0035  0.0114 ** 0.0187 *** 0.0106 ** 0.0146 *** 
  (0.0041)  (0.0047)   (0.0048)   (0.0048)   (0.0048)   
IEA (Self) 5-8 quarters ago -0.0300 *** -0.0159 *** -0.0088 * -0.0159 *** -0.0121 ** 
  (0.0043)  (0.0048)   (0.0048)   (0.0049)   (0.0049)   
IEA (Reputation) 1-4 quarters ago   -0.0081   -0.0152 *** -0.0041   -0.0101 ** 
    (0.0049)   (0.0050)   (0.0051)   (0.0051)   
IEA (Reputation) 5-8 quarters ago   -0.0363 *** -0.0224 *** -0.0400 *** -0.0273 *** 
    (0.0053)   (0.0054)   (0.0052)   (0.0053)   
Inspected and no violation detected 1-4 quarters ago 0.0490 *** 0.0547 *** 0.0552 *** 0.0639 *** 0.0561 *** 
  (0.0177)  (0.0176)   (0.0165)   (0.0177)   (0.0166)   
Inspected and no violation detected 5-8 quarters ago -0.1932 *** -0.1901 *** -0.0678 *** -0.1954 *** -0.0774 *** 
  (0.0181)  (0.0180)   (0.0182)   (0.0181)   (0.0182)   
Number of significant violation 1-4 quarters ago 0.6240 *** 0.6167 *** 0.6143 *** 0.6179 *** 0.6125 *** 
  (0.0075)  (0.0075)   (0.0075)   (0.0076)   (0.0076)   
Number of significant violation 5-8quarters ago 0.0347 *** 0.0267 *** 0.0463 *** 0.0376 *** 0.0542 *** 
  (0.0080)  (0.0080)   (0.0080)   (0.0081)   (0.0081)   
Percent urban -0.0001  0.0047   -0.0006   -0.0030   -0.0056   
  (0.0342)  (0.0342)   (0.0344)   (0.0344)   (0.0346)   
Percent white 0.2190 *** 0.0342   0.1534 *** 0.0232   0.1184 ** 
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Specification 
  A B C D E 
  (0.0555)  (0.0578)   (0.0567)   (0.0591)   (0.0581)   
Unemployment rate -0.0116 *** -0.0163 *** -0.0182 *** -0.0145 *** -0.0096 ** 
  (0.0035)  (0.0035)   (0.0035)   (0.0038)   (0.0038)   
Percent of owner occupant -0.3913 *** -0.1631 * -0.1915 * -0.1282   -0.0526   
  (0.0939)  (0.0963)   (0.0984)   (0.1006)   (0.1030)   
Percent of bachelor + graduate degree -1.2098 *** -1.3590 *** -1.2662 *** -1.2586 *** -0.9568 *** 
  (0.1470)  (0.1489)   (0.1500)   (0.1573)   (0.1590)   
Primary industry -0.1022 *** -0.0780 *** -0.1385 *** -0.0827 *** -0.1422 *** 
  (0.0231)  (0.0233)   (0.0236)   (0.0235)   (0.0237)   
Not on ELG 0.1336 *** 0.1377 *** 0.0698   0.1299 *** 0.0648   
  (0.0467)  (0.0468)   (0.0468)   (0.0472)   (0.0472)   
Average penalty 0.0232 *** 0.0275 *** 0.0369 *** 0.0261 *** 0.0356 *** 
  (0.0036)  (0.0037)   (0.0037)   (0.0037)   (0.0037)   
Average IEA 0.1949 *** 0.3282 *** 0.2665 *** 0.3275 *** 0.2940 *** 
  (0.0276)  (0.0300)   (0.0302)   (0.0307)   (0.0309)   
Average inspection -0.4948 *** -0.4858 *** 0.0600 ** -0.4831 *** 0.0436   
  (0.0321)  (0.0312)   (0.0278)   (0.0313)   (0.0286)   
Constant -0.5332 *** -0.3932 *** -0.2583 *** -0.2011 ** -0.2152 ** 
  (0.0867)   (0.0888)   (0.0893)   (0.0974)   (0.0976)   
Seasonal dummies and time effects are omitted for brevity 
*, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively   
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